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WHAT TO DO WHEN THERE'S NO "I DO": A MODEL
FOR AWARDING DAMAGES UNDER PROMISSORY
ESTOPPEL
Neil G. Williams*
Abstract- Since its inception in the seventeenth century, the common-law action for breach
of promise to marry has been the subject of recurrent legal debates. Beginning in the 1930s,
some states began passing statutes that abolished the action altogether. Even so, today about
half of American jurisdictions retain the breach-of-promise action in some form.
This Article advocates a compromise that is not currently the law in any American
jurisdiction: parties who breach promises to marty should be liable for damages, but only to
the extent they have induced reliance by those to whom they were formerly engaged. Under
this proposed model, courts would employ promissory estoppel to define both the nature and
scope of damages available to those aggrieved by broken nuptial promises. Through the prism
of promissory estoppel, this Article re-examines the broad range of damages courts
traditionally awarded breach-of-promise plaintiffs at common law and explains why, given
modem social conditions, reliance damages are the only appropriate elements of recovery. In
this context, reliance damages would include provision both for expenditures made and
economic opportunities foregone in anticipation of marriage. The reliance-based approach
advocated in this Article would encourage responsibility, honesty, and forthrightness in
romantic relationships, but avoid the abuses associated with the historical breach-of-promise
action.
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INTRODUCTION
At common law, a party who breaches a promise to marry can be sued
for considerable damages.' Beginning in the 1930 s,2 twenty-five states
enacted legislation, commonly known as "hea-tbalm" statutes,3
abolishing the common-law action for breach of promise to marry.4
1. E.g., 1 Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the bnited States § 1.4 (2d ed.
1987); Charles T. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages § 111 (1935). Hereinafter, the
common-law action for breach of a promise to marry will often be referred to simply as the breach-
of-promise action.
2. 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.5, at 21; Note, Heartbalm Statutes and Deceit Actions, 83 Mich. L.
Rev. 1770, 1770-71 (1985).
3. 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.5, at 21; Note, supra note 2, at 1771. The "heartbalm" terminology is
also broad enough to capture statutes that abolished the common-law torts of seduction, criminal
conversation and alienation of affections. See Nathan P. Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart
Balm, " 33 Mich L. Rev. 979, 979 (1935). The statutes are also sometimes referred to as "Anti-
Heartbalm Acts." See Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-
Century America 63 (1985).
4. See Ala. Code §§ 6-5-330 to 331 (1977); Cal. Civ. Code §§ 43.4-43.5 (West 1982); Colo. Rev.
Stat. §§ 13-20-202 to 203 (1989); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-572b (West '991); Del. Code Ann. tiL
10, § 3924 (1975); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 771.01-.07 (West 1986); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 34-4-4-1 to 8
(West 1986); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 854 (West 1980); Md. Code An., Fam. Law §§ 3-102 to
104 (1991); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. cl. 207, § 47A (West 1981); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 600.2901 (West 1986); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 553.01-.03 (West 1988); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-601
to 606 (1991); Nev. Rev. Stat Ann. §§ 41.370-.420 (Michie 1986); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:11
(1983); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2A:23-1 (West 1992); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 80a-84 (McKinney 1992);
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Three other states have adopted statutes that place limitations on the
breach-of-promise action. About half of American jurisdictions,
therefore, still recognize the action in some form.'
In acknowledging this split among the states, Professor Michael
Grossberg characterizes the public policy debate over the breach-of-
promise action as having "ended in stalemate,"7 with no one viewpoint
being able to "fashion a convincing definition of the public interest in
courtship that would vanquish its opponents."8 This Article revisits the
public-policy debate from the vantage point of the late twentieth century.
In the end, it is clear that the heartbalm statutes provide too much
protection to parties who dishonor promises to marry, thereby insulating
them from responsibility for the consequences of their actions.9
However, retaining the action in its traditional form is clearly out of step
with contemporary mores and social attitudes.' Instead, a more
appropriate approach lies on middle ground presently unoccupied by any
state court or legislature: parties who breach promises to marry should
bear responsibility for their conduct, but only to the extent they have
induced reliance by those to whom they were formerly engaged."
N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02-06 (1991); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.29 (Anderson 1991); Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 23, §1901 (1991); Vt. Stat Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1001-1003 (1989); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-220
(1992); W. Va. Code § 56-3-2a (Supp. 1992); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 768.01-.08 (West 1981); Wyo.
Stat. §§ 1-23-101 to 104 (1988).
The District of Columbia also has abolished the breach-of-promise action. See D.C. Code Ann.
§ 16-923 (1989). For a source that provides a summary chart (updated from time to time) of the
status of the breach-of-promise action in various American jurisdictions, see Leonard Karp & Cheryl
L. Karp, Domestic Torts: Family Violence, Conflict and SexualAbuse app. k (1989 & Supp. 1995).
5. See Breach of Promise Act, Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. ch. 740, §§ 1511-1515 (West 1993) (limiting
recoverable damages to "actual damages" and imposing notice requirement); S.C. Code Ann. § 32-3-
10(3) (Law. Co-op. 1991) (requiring promise to marry to be evidenced by written memorandum);
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-3-401 to 405 (1991) (requiring corroboration of alleged nuptial promise by
written evidence or two disinterested witnesses and allowing jury to consider age and experience of
parties as basis for reducing damages); see also infra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing
the Illinois Breach of Promise Act).
In Stanard v. Bolin, 88 Wash. 2d 614, 565 P.2d 94 (1977), without a legislative mandate, the
Washington Supreme Court became the only state court to place a substantial limitation on the
breach-of-promise action. The court ruled that, in Washington, breach-of-promise plaintiffs would
no longer be able to recover damages for loss of expected financial and social position, but otherwise
left the action intact Id. at 620-21, 565 P.2d at 97-98. For criticism of the Washington Supreme
Court's refusal to limit recovery of damages for emotional anguish, see infra part IV.B.2.
6. Note, supra note 2, at 1771 n.7.
7. Grossberg, supra note 3, at 63.
8. Id.
9. See infra part IV.BA.
10. See infra parts IV.B.1-B.3.
11. See infra part IV.B.
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Promissory estoppel provides the framework for reaching this
compromise."
Part I contains a brief examination of the history and theoretical
foundation of the breach-of-promise action,3 followed by a detailed
discussion of the broad range of damages courts have awarded breach-of-
promise plaintiffs. 4 Part I closes with an in-depth review of the
criticisms that inspired the enactment of heartbalm statutes by a number
of state legislatures. 5 As noted in this Article, many of the complaints
against the action were founded on unfair stereotypes of female
plaintiffs. 16 Part II identifies the circumstances which necessitate the type
of dispassionate re-evaluation undertaken in this Article as to whether it
is appropriate to impose liability for breach of a promise to marry, and if
so, to what extent. Among other things, part II, recognizing evolving
attitudes about gender, employment, courtship, marriage, and divorce,
discusses modem laws that hold people to higher standards of conduct in
a variety of interactions between the sexes. The analysis set forth in part
II demonstrates how a breach of a promise to marry, due in part to the
evolution of values, does not harm late twentieth century women in the
same manner, or to the same extent, as nineteenth century women. 17
Nevertheless, as observed at the close of part II, broken nuptial promises
continue to be a source of considerable economic harm in today's
society.
In part III, the relationship of the breach-of-promise action to general
contract theory is analyzed. Courts concluded that engaged parties
entered into a contract when they exchanged promises to marry. 8 The
discussion reveals, however, that in developing the breach-of-promise
action, nineteenth-century courts made stark departures from the rather
rigid rules they applied in contracts cases involving commercial parties. 9
With their focus on contextual fairness considerations, these courts,
when developing the breach-of-promise action, appear to have
anticipated the development of the more flexible contract law of the
12. See infra part IV.B.
13. See infra part I.A.
14. These damages comprise an atypical mix of contract and tort damages. See infra part I.B.
15. See infra part I.C.
16. See infra part I.C.
17. See infra part II.
18. See infra part III.
19. See infra part IIl.
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twentieth century.2" In that regard, the protection of reliance interests has
emerged as one of the fairness considerations at the heart of modem
contract law.21
Part IV begins with a discussion of promissory estoppel, which is the
general reliance-based theory of obligation set out in section 90 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.2 The Article next argues that
promissory estoppel, rather than bargain contract, is the common-law
theory best suited to reformulate liability for breaches of promises to
marry in terms that reflect the mores and social realities of the late
twentieth century.' Employing section 90 to re-examine the major types
of damages awarded under the traditional breach-of-promise action
provides substantial support for the conclusions prescribed in this
Article: that the liability of a party who breaches a promise to marry
should be measured by, and limited to, reliance costs reasonably incurred
by a prospective mate.24 These costs generally will include expenditures
incurred in preparation for the wedding ceremony and the value of
opportunities foregone in reliance on a broken nuptial promise.' Another
benefit of reliance-based liability is the potential for strengthening
romantic relationships, by encouraging responsibility, honesty, and
forthrightness, without being susceptible to abuses associated with the
traditional breach-of-promise action.26
In part V, the manner in which the reliance-based liability model can
be integrated into existing schemes is outlined. Specifically, courts in
jurisdictions with heartbalm statutes could consider expanding the scope
of liability for breaches of promises to marry by recognizing a
promissory-estoppel exception to the statutes. Conversely, in
jurisdictions that have not legislatively abolished the breach-of-promise
action, courts could adopt the reasoning, in this Article to limit the
liability of a party who breaches a nuptial promise to the aggrieved
party's reliance interest.' 7 However, in spite of the ability of the courts to
limit liability to reliance-based interests as argued herein, state
legislatures, in light of troublesome case law precedent, constitute the
20. See infra part HI.
21. See infra part Ji.
22. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1979) [hereinafter Second Restatement].
23. See infra part IV.A.
24. See infra part IV.B.
25. See infra part IV.B.4.
26. See infra part IV.B.4.
27. See infra part V.
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most promising venues for advocating the recognition of reliance-based
liability.
28
I. THE TRADITIONAL BREACH-OF-PROMISE ACTION AND
ITS CRITICS
A. General History of the Breach-of-Promise Action
In England, ecclesiastical courts were the first to assert jurisdiction
over promises to marry.29 These courts, however, could not award
damages for breach of a nuptial promise.3" Instead, by threatening to
expel breaching parties from the church, ecclesiastical courts would often
"persuade" those parties to honor their promises of marriage." By the
fifteenth century,32 English courts of law began exercising jurisdiction
over nuptial promises, but only in cases where an aggrieved party alleged
that the breaching party deceitfully made a promise to marry.33 In these
early cases, the jilted lover typically was able to recover only
expenditures made in reliance on the deceitful promise to marry.34 In the
seventeenth century, however, English common-law courts began
awarding damages for breached promises to marry, without requiring
proof that breaching parties acted fraudulently.35
28. See infra part V.
29. Grossberg, supra note 3, at 34; W.r. Brockelbank, The Nature of the .Promise to Marry (pt. 1),
41 Ill. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1946).
30. Grossberg, supra note 3, at 34; Brockelbank, supra note 29, at 3.
31. Grossberg, supra note 3, at 34; Brockelbank, supra note 29, at 3.
32. See Brockelbank, supra note 29, at 3.
33. See id.; 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.1, at 1; Grossberg, supra note 3, at 34.
34. See 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.1, at 1. Therefore, by advocating reliance-based recovery under
promissory estoppel, this Article proposes recovery for breach of a nuptial promise similar to the
recovery originally available at common law. But under promissory estopp el, a promisee's reliance
interest would include, in addition to out-of-pocket expenditures, the value of foregone
opportunities. See infra part IV.B.4. In addition, it would not be nec.ssary for an aggrieved
promisee, under promissory estoppel, to establish that the promisor fraudulently made the broken
nuptial promise.
For an article that advocates the recognition of a deceit exception to hearthalm statutes, see Note,
supra note 2, at 1780-97. Interestingly, as was the case with the original action at common law, the
approach recommended in that article also would largely limit a promisee's recovery for a fraudulent
nuptial promise to out-of-pocket expenditures. See id. at 1788-90. Professor Larson argues that the
emerging tort of sexual fraud should be applied in situations where a promise to marry is
fraudulently made in order to procure sexual relations. Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So
Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit"': A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 Colum. L. Rev.
374,466 (1993).
35. See 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.1, at 1; Brockelbank, supra note 29, at 3-4.
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The breach-of-promise action proved to be a popular import to
American jurisdictions.36 In fact, the action was so well received in the
former colonies that, by the late nineteenth century, breach-of-promise
suits were more prevalent in America than in England. 37 Breach-of-
promise cases became a genuine social phenomenon. Many people
attended trials dealing with broken hearts and broken promises for
purposes of entertainment.38 Presaging modem tabloid journalism, the
media of that earlier generation often covered breach-of-promise suits in
a manner that veered toward sensationalism. 39 As detailed in part I.C, the
parties who brought these suits, almost always women,4" became favorite
targets of commentators.4
The theoretical basis for enforcing promises to marry at common law
was an assumption that engaged parties entered into a contract when they
exchanged promises to marry.42 In essence, courts would treat a proposal
of marriage as an offer that became legally enforceable when it was
accepted.43
B. Damages Awarded for Breach-of-Promise To Many
Damages awarded in breach-of-promise actions exceed those that
would be available to aggrieved parties if courts adhered strictly to a
contract model.' Generally speaking, in a breach of contract suit, the
party aggrieved by the breach recovers "expectation damages"--those
that will place her in the position she would have been in had the contract
been performed. 45 Accordingly, consistent with such an expectation-
damages approach, courts hearing breach-of-promise actions would
generally award the complainant an amount that would place her in the
36. See Grossberg, supra note 3, at 35; 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1, at 2.
37. See Grossberg, supra note 3, at 37.
38. See Rosemary J. Coombe, 'The Most Disgusting, Disgraceful and Inequitous Proceeding in
Our Law'. The Action for Breach of Promise of Marriage in Nineteenth-Century Ontario, 38 U.
Toronto L.J. 64,64 (1988).
39. See Mary Coombs, Agency and Partnership: A Study of Breach of Promise Plaintiffs, 2 Yale
J.L. & Feminism 1, 16 (1989).
40. See McCormick, supra note 1, § I 11, at 397; Grossberg, supra note 3, at 37-38, 53.
41. See infra part I.C.
42. See Grossberg, supra note 3, at 34; 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.1, at 2; Brockelbank, supra note
29, at 4.
43. See 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.2, at 6.
44. See generally McCormick, supra note 1, § 111, at 397-98; 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.4;
Coombs, supra note 39, at 4-6.
45. E.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.8, at 871-72 (1990).
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position, financial and social, she would have enjoyed had the marriage
taken place.46 In effect, the aggrieved party was deemed to have a claim
to the breaching party's assets and future income akin to what a
divorcing spouse might assert. 7
In addition, a successful breach-of-promise plaintiff could recover
unreimbursed expenditures made in preparation for the impending
marriage, if such expenditures were incurred in reliance on the broken
nuptial promise.48 This was permitted even though, under general contact
theory, it would be deemed inappropriate to allow recovery of these
expenditures if expectation damages have been awarded.49 Opportunities
foregone in reliance on a promise of marriage were also sometimes
awarded in the traditional breach-of-promise action.s° For example, some
plaintiffs were awarded damages for employment opportunities foregone
in reliance on a breached promise of marriage." Also, upon appropriate
proof, an aggrieved party might even recover damages to the extent the
breach impaired her prospects of marrying someone else. 2
Moreover, successful breach-of-promise plaintiffs were also able to
recover items of damages often associated with the law of torts. 3 For
example, they were sometimes awarded damages for the emotional
anguish and humiliation caused by broken nuptial promises. 4 Upon
46. See I Clark, supra note 1, § 1.4, at 17-18; McCormick, supra note 1, § 111, at 399-400;
Coombs, supra note 39, at 4.
47. See Coombs, supra note 39, at 3-4 n. 15; Brockelbank, supra note 29. at 11.
48. See 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.4, at 18; McCormick, supra note 1, § 111, at 398.
49. See Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 12.16, at 930-31; Theodore W. Cousens, The Law of
Damages as Applied to Breach of Promise of Marriage, 17 Cornell L.Q. 367, 368 (1932).
50. See 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.4, at 18.
51. Id.
52. See id.; McCormick, supra note 1, § 111, at 398; Cousens, supra note 49, at 381.
53. See 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.4, at 17; McCormick, supra note 1, § 111, at 397; Harter F.
Wright, Action for Breach of the Marriage Promise, 10 Va. L. Rev. 361. 371-75 (1924). But see
Brockelbank, supra note 29, at 11-12 (observing that, despite sources claiming that most breach-of-
promise damages are tortious, the majority of the damages can be reconciled with contract theory).
In several other respects, the breach-of-promise action arguably resembles tort more than contract.
For example, the right to recover damages for breach of a nuptial promise cloes not survive the death
of a promisee. Id. at 5. Moreover, a breach-of-promise plaintiff cannot assign her right of action, as
she would be able to do with a pure contract claim. Id. at 6.
54. See 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.4, at 17; McCormick, supra note 1, § t 1l, at 398; Brockelbank,
supra note 29, at 12.
In cases in which a plaintiff had given birth to a defendant's child, she also often was awarded
aggravated damages (under a "seduction" theory) for the humiliation asseciated with the out-of-
wedlock birth. 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.4, at 18-19. Generally, at common law, a woman could not
sue for her own seduction, under the theory that she had consented to the objectionable intercourse.
McCormick, supra note 1, § 111, at 394. Therefore, common-law actions fcr seduction generally had
1026
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proving that an engagement had been terminated in an especially
egregious manner, a victim of a broken promise of marriage might also
recover punitive damages in many jurisdictions." Consequently, an
aggrieved party in a breach-of-promise action could conceivably recover,
among other items described herein, expectation damages, unreimbursed
expenditures, and damages for foregone opportunities and pain and
suffering.
In a traditional breach-of-promise action, a defendant could seek to
reduce damages against him by showing that a plaintiff lacked chastity or
otherwise acted in a manner substantially at odds with prevailing norms
of womanhood. 6 Caution had to be exercised in pursuing this litigation
tactic, however, because additional damages could be awarded if a jury
decided that a defendant made a bad-faith attempt to reduce recoverable
damages by casting unfounded aspersions against a plaintiff's
character.
to be maintained by the father of the woman who had allegedly been seduced. Larson, supra note 34,
at 382-84; McCormick, supra note 1, § 111, at 394-95. As a resuit, the breach-of-promise action
provided an indirect route for women to sue for seduction on their own behalf, particularly in
situations involving pregnancy. See McCormick, supra note 1, § 111, at 400-01; 1 Clark, supra note
1, § 1.4, at 19. This was an especially valuable right prior to the advent of modem child-support
statutes. Coombs, supra note 39, at 11. Courts, in essence, abided a fiction that the seduction was "a
circumstance to be considered in estimating the damages for the breach of promise." McCormick,
supra note 1, § I 1l, at 401.
In addition to its focus on barring the breach-of-promise action, the heartbalm reform movement
also sought to eradicate the common-law action of seduction. See Larson, supra note 34, at 394 n.85.
Toward that end, approximately one-third of American jurisdictions legislatively abolished the
seduction tort. Id. at 394. For a discussion of the relationship of the tort of seduction to an emerging
common-law tort of sexual fraud, see id. at 401-12. When a fraudulent nuptial promise is used as a
ploy to gain access to sexual relations, the tort of sexual fraud would provide adequate redress. See
id. at 466. If a child is born of such a union, modem child-support statutes also are available.
Accordingly, the breach-of-promise action is no longer needed to redress "seduction." The
emergence of the tort of sexual fraud is emblematic of the evolution of social and sexual mores in the
twentieth century. See infra part II.
55. See McCormick, supra note 1, § I 1, at 402-03 (noting that award of punitive damages must
be supported by showing of "fraud, malice, or wantonness"); 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1A, at 20
(noting that punitive damages were awarded if a "defendant had the required malicious or wanton
state ofrmind").
56. See McCormick, supra note 1, § 111, at 401; 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.4, at 19-20;
Grossberg, supra note 3, at 43-44.
57. McCormick, supra note 1, § 111, at 402; 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.4, at 20.
1027
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C. Criticisms of the Action
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the breach-of-
promise action had become the subject of scathing criticism. 8
Considered exorbitant by many critics, damages awarded in breach-of-
promise cases were cited as grounds for limiting or ever, dismantling the
action altogether. 9 In particular, as described above, some academic
opponents of the action chastised courts for illogically melding elements
of both contract and tort damages in breach-of-promise cases."
Critics also condemned the evidentiary standards applied by courts in
suits seeking redress for broken nuptial promises.61 They contended that
too broad a range of evidence was admissible in these cases, thereby
contributing to the circus atmosphere that often surrounded breach-of-
promise suits.62 For example, since her perceived sexual purity and
reputation were relevant in assessing damages,63 lurid details regarding a
plaintiff's sexual history were often introduced into evidence.'
Similarly, Professor McCormick believed the fount of excessive jury
awards, in many cases, to be the introduction into evidence of
information about a defendant's financial status.65 Some also argued that
the evidentiary requirements courts imposed on breach-of-promise
plaintiffs often were too lenient. In some instances, they asserted, courts
permitted a plaintiff to prevail when her uncorroborated testimony was
58. See generally Grossberg, supra note 3, at 51-56; McCormick, supra note 1, § 111, at 403-
406; Coombs, supra note 39, at 5-9; Wright, supra note 53, passim; Edwin W. Hadley, Breach of
Promise to Marry, 2 Notre Dame Law. 190, 192-95 (1927); Anthony M. Turano, Breach of
Promise: Still a Racket, 32 Am. Mercury 40passim (1934).
59. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 1, § 111, at 403-04 & n.56 (including table to demonstrate
that judgments in breach of promise cases "are often seemingly disproportionate to amounts given
for more substantial claims, such as bodily injuries"); Wright, supra note 53, at 371-75 (condemning
awards in breach-of-promise cases on various grounds, including the proposition that "the average
jury" is "proverbially generous with the money of other people').
60. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
61. See I Clark, supra note 1, § 1.2, at 4-6; Grossberg, supra note 3, at 40; Note, supra note 2, at
1777; Coombs, supra note 39, at 5 & n.22.
62. Admissible evidence included intimate details of the litigants' personal lives. See
Brockelbank, supra note 29, at 13 (arguing that innocent men would often settle in order to avoid a
public trial and resulting "financial ruin ... and social ostracism"); Coombs, supra note 39, at 16
(observing that "the cases that actually went to trial were a fount of offensively sensationalistic
testimony").
63. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
64. See Grossberg, supra note 3, at 40-44.
65. McCormick, supra note 1, § 111, at 399.
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the only substantial evidence that a defendant had in fact made a promise
to marry. 6
6
The concerns about the size of verdicts and permissive evidentiary
standards were magnified by negative attitudes about the women who
brought breach-of-promise suits. 7 If one believed the characterizations
of critics, one would surmise that the typical breach-of-promise case
involved a conniving adventuress of low character68 who attempted to
take advantage of a trusting man of high means. 9 The all-male juries of
an earlier age were also perceived to be the unwitting tools of these
supposedly scheming women.7" As one often-quoted critic expressed a
prevailing sentiment, the verdicts in breach-of-promise cases tended
primarily to be a product of two factors: "the plaintiff's beauty and the
defendant's ability to pay."'" Moreover, there was a perception that in
many cases women used breach-of-promise suits as a tool to blackmail
innocent men who did not want their good names sullied in a public
venue.72 Not surprisingly, the term "gold-digger" traces its origins to a
66. See Grossberg, supra note 3, at 40; 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.2, at 4-5; Note, supra note 2, at
1776-77; Hadley, supra note 58, at 194 (describing breach-of-promise action as a "law which aids
the perjured money-grabbing of Mammon-worshiping plaintiffs").
67. See generally Grossberg, supra note 3, at 52-56; Coombs, supra note 39, at 6-9; Larson,
supra note 34, at 394-97; Coombe supra note 38, at 81 (describing similar perceptions of women
breach-of-promise plaintiffs in Canada).
68. Indeed, to many, the very fact that a woman brought such a suit was evidence of her low
character. See McCormick, supra note 1, § 111, at 405 ("The remedy will never help the sensitive
and refined woman, for she will never thus parade in public her wounds of the heart.'); Hadley,
supra note 58, at 193 (describing the "vast majority of plaintiffs [as being] of low character and
dubious veracity'); Wright, supra note 53, at 377 ("Even very inferior women ... will submit to the
gravest injustice without retaliation. This is the feminine nature, because love is so large a part of
their being, and we say it in their honour.").
69. See Grossberg, supra note 3, at 54-55; Coombs, supra note 39, at 16. Professor Grossberg
argues, however, that the public perception of breach-of-promise plaintiffs differed dramatically
from the reality represented by cases that were appealed in the late nineteenth century: "[These cases
are] peopled with pregnant servants, anguished farm girls, and duped daughters.... Nevertheless,
the stereotype began to dominate public attitudes, and helped sustain charges that the breach-of-
promise suit undermined matrimony, thereby threatening society itself." Grossberg, supra note 3, at
55. See also Coombs, supra note 39, at 16 n.115 (arguing that appellate cases "show a complexity of
stories behind the lawsuits, and do not reinforce the 'gold-digger' image"); Larson, supra note 34, at
395-97 (asserting that misogynistic attitudes played a role in public perception of women who
sought heartbalm relief).
70. See McCormick, supra note 1, § 111, at 405; Coombs, supra note 39, at 7.
71. Wright, supra note 53, at 374. See also Grossberg, supra note 3, at 56 (describing argument
by popular Baptist minister that breach-of-promise plaintiffs exploited the "natural kindness in man
toward a woman").
72. See McCormick, supra note I, § 111, at 403-05; Grossberg, supra note 3, at 52-53; Coombs,
supra note 39, at 7; Note, supra note 2, at 1776.
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novel about a breach-of-promise plaintiff.73 Interestingly, early feminists
also joined the chorus of voices condemning breach-of-promise plaintiffs
(who were viewed contemptuously as perpetuating stereotypes about the
economic dependency of women).74 Indeed, in seve:al states, women
legislators were the sponsors of heartbalm legislation.75
Objectors to the breach-of-promise action also pointed to an evolution
of attitudes about marriage as justification for abolishing the action.
When the breach-of-promise action first gained prominence in America,
marriages (particularly among the wealthy) were often arranged affairs
negotiated by families on the basis of financial and property
considerations.76 In particular, as part of the nuptial arrangements, the
father of the bride often agreed to transfer property 1:0 the prospective
groom upon consummation of the marriage.77 Under these circumstances,
opponents observed, it might make sense to provide a contractual remedy
for breaches of promises to marry; nuptial promises (like commercial
promises) were means of facilitating the transfer of poperty interests.78
However, by the late nineteenth century, the norm of companionate
marriage 9 supplanted the view that it was appropriate to approach
marriage like a type of inter-family business transaction." Given this
shift in sentiment, critics argued that granting a damages remedy for
breach of a promise to marry had the unfortunate effect of
commercializing matters of the heart.8 Where there is no love, they
maintained, there should be no marriage. As one writer wryly observed,
the breach-of-promise action had the effect of weighing "[t]he ashes...
on the cold altar after the sacred flame has gone out."82
Expanding on the theme of companionate marriage, critics argued that
a party who had fallen out of love with a prospective mate should be
73. See Coombs, supra note 39, at 7 n.31, 12-13 (discussing Anita Loos, Gentlemen Prefer
Blondes (1925)).
74. See Grossberg, supra note 3, at 55; Coombs, supra note 39, at 12-13; Larson, supra note 34,
at 397-98.
75. Coombs, supra note 39, at 12; Larson, supra note 34, at 397.
76. 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.1, at 2; Grossberg, supra note 3, at 34-35.
77. See Grossberg, supra note 3, at 35.
78. 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.1, at 2; Grossberg, supra note 3, at 35.
79. Companionate marriages are those based on mutual love and affection. Coombs, supra note
39, at 8.
80. See Coombs, supra note 39, at 8; Note, supra note 2, at 1778; Grossberg, supra note 3, at 58-
59; 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.1, at 2-3.
81. See McCormick, supra note 1, § I 11, at 405; Grossberg, supra note 3, at 59.
82. See McCormick, supra note 1, § 111, at 405 (quoting James Schouler).
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granted the utmost flexibility to end the engagement. Awarding
damages to a jilted flanc6e, they conjectured, unfairly penalized conduct
that was meritorious.8 4 A party who ends an engagement, in their view,
should be commended for eschewing a union that was destined to be
loveless and unstable, thereby avoiding harm to the institution of
marriage and any children who might have been born of the pairing. 5 In
the opinion of these commentators, an engagement constitutes a sort of
probationary period during which prospective mates should explore their
compatibility. 6 A person might indeed suffer emotional anguish as a
result of an engagement's being broken, the critics admitted, but money
cannot heal a broken heart-a refrain often paraphrased in many
heartbalm statutes.88
II. THE BREACH-OF-PROMISE ACTION AND A CHANGING
SOCIETY
The criticisms of the breach-of-promise action fueled the legislative
reform movement that led to the adoption of heartbalm statutes in some
American jurisdictions. 9 As a federal district court suggested in 1994,
83. See Grossberg, supra note 3, at 58-59; Coombs, supra note 39, at 8; Wright, supra note 53, at
369-70 (quoting Lord Mansfield as saying that "it would be most mischievous to compel parties to
marry who can never live happily together").
84. See Grossberg, supra note 3, at 58-59; Coombs, supra note 39, at 8; Note, supra note 2, at
1778.
85. See Grossberg, supra note 3, at 58; Wright, supra note 53, at 380-81.
86. See Grossberg, supra note 3, at 58-59; Wright, supra note 53, at 369-70; Note, supra note 2,
at 1778.
87. See Coombs, supra note 39, at 12.
88. See infra note 89.
89. 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.5, at 21-22; Grossberg, supra note 3, at 62-63. A number of
jurisdictions incorporated some of the critics' standard arguments in the heartbalm statutes'
statements of purpose. For example, although the Illinois Breach of Promise Act only limits
available damages, it sets out in its statement of purpose excoriating language similar to that used in
a number of heartbalm statutes:
It is hereby declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the remedy heretofore
provided by law for the enforcement of actions based upon breaches of promises or agreements
to marry has been subject to grave abuses and has been used as an instrument for blackmail by
unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment, due to the indefiniteness of the damages
recoverable in such actions and the consequent fear of persons threatened with such actions that
exorbitant damages might be assessed against them. It is also hereby declared that the award of
monetary damages in such actions is ineffective as a recompense for genuine mental or
emotional distress.
11. Comp. Stat. Ann. ch. 740, § 15/1. For a discussion of the Illinois Breach of Promise Act, see
infra note 247.
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however, those who voted for legislation abolishing or limiting the
breach-of-promise action may have been more heavily swayed by
negative attitudes about "overzealous" female plaintiffs than by
"changing societal views of engagement and marriage." This is of
particular concern, because it is apparent in retrospect that many of the
charges leveled against breach-of-promise plaintiffs were exaggerated
and tainted by sexist attitudes.91
Some 60 years after the enactment of the first heartbalm statutes, the
time is ripe for an objective re-evaluation of whether it is appropriate to
impose liability for breach of a promise to marry; and if so, to what
extent liability should be imposed. Although they are not as legion as
they once were, cases involving the breach-of-promise action still appear
in the appellate reports of jurisdictions that retain the breach-of-promise
action.92 Interestingly, most appellate cases involving allegations of
broken nuptial promises appear to be in jurisdictions that abolished the
breach-of-promise action, where courts are still attempting to define the
exact scope of the heartbaim statutes.93 As a result of this litigation,
parties in the great majority of heartbaim jurisdictions may recover, in
equity, gifts given a betrothed in contemplation of a marriage that does
not occur.94 However, when confronted with the issue, the majority of
courts in heartbalm jurisdictions have ruled that a party who dishonors a
promise of marriage is barred from recovering the engagement ring."
Prohibiting the return of the ring evinces the courts' uneasiness with a
90. See Wildey v. Springs, 840 F. Supp. 1259, 1262 (N.D. Ill. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 47
F.3d 1475 (7th Cir. 1995). See infra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Wildey).
91. See Grossberg, supra note 3, at 54-55; Coombs, supra note 39, at 6-8; Larson, supra note 34,
at 395-98; cf. Frederick L. Kane, Heart Balm and Public Policy, 5 Fordhem L. Rev. 63, 71 (1936)
(suggesting that heartbalm statutes, like prohibition, were largely products of "a smoke screen of
false agitation").
92. See Wildey, 840 F. Supp. 1259; Thorpe v. Collins, 263 S.E.2d 115 (Ga. 1980); Glass v. Wiltz,
551 So. 2d 32 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Menhusen v. Dake, 334 N.W.2d 435 (Neb. 1983); Kuhlman v.
Cargile, 262 N.W.2d 454 (Neb. 1978); Hutchins v. Day, 153 S.E.2d 132 (N.C. 1967); Bradley v.
Somers, 322 S.E.2d 665 (S.C. 1984); Scanlon v. Crim, 500 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973);
Stanard v. Bolin, 88 Wash. 2d 614, 565 P.2d 94 (1977). For discussions of Wildey and Stanard, see
infra part IV.B.2.
93. See the cases collected in John D. Perovich, Annotation, Rights in Respect of Engagement and
Courtship Presents When Marriage Does Not Ensue, 46 A.L.R.3d 578, 588-95 (1972 & Supp.
1995). See also infra note 306 (listing cases refusing to recognize relince-based exceptions to
heartbalm statutes).
94. See Perovich, supra note 93, at 588-95.
95. See id. at 602-04. But see Aronow v. Silver, 538 A.2d 851, 852 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1987) (acknowledging majority rule, but electing to adopt minority position). For a discussion of the
implications of judicial uneasiness with the wholesale abandonment of the fault ideal, see infra part
V.
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wholesale abandonment of the fault ideal. In addition, contemporary
state legislatures still find themselves confronted from time to time with
proposals for heartbalm reform.96 Occasionally, reminiscent of the
breach-of-promise action's heyday, a case involving a jilted flanc6 or
fiance will garner considerable media attention.97
Indeed, a great deal has changed in our society since the first
heartbalm statutes were enacted in the 1930s. Attitudes about gender,
employment, courtship, marriage, and divorce have undergone
fundamental transformation.98 In contexts where they were once
insulated from liability, people are now expected to bear greater
responsibility for the impact of their conduct on members of the opposite
sex. Consequently, the law has evolved to hold people to higher
standards of conduct in a variety of situations where there are
interactions between the sexes.99 For example, in relation to employment,
statutes have been enacted that prohibit acts of sexual discrimination and
harassment." ° No longer is the employment relationship viewed as a
predatory preserve in which it is up to women to fend for themselves
without the benefit of legal protections.
Although the focal point of their movement was the breach-of-
promise action,"'1 heartbalm reformers felt that many of the basic
arguments they raised were also applicable to the tort of seduction,0 2
another common-law action that policed sexual relationships and peaked
in popularity in the late nineteenth century. 03 Not surprisingly, an
additional legacy of the heartbalm movement was the enactment, in
about one-third of American jurisdictions, of legislation that abolished
96. For a discussion of the failure of a 1994 heartbalm proposal in the Illinois legislature, see infra
note 247.
97. For example, the recent Wildey litigation was extensively covered by the media. See, e.g.,
Daniel J. Lehmann, Court Discards Jury Award to Jilted Fiancee, Chi. Sun-Times, Jan. 21, 1995, at
5; Gretchen Reynolds, A Breach of Promise, Chi. Mag., April 1994, at 63.
98. See generally Lenore J. Weitzman, The Marriage Contract: Spouses, Lovers, and the Law
135-67 (1981) (examining trends in marriage, divorce, and economic options for women).
99. See Larson, supra note 34, at 439-40 (pointing to reformulation of public-private dichotomy
in the context of sexual interactions in the workplace and arguing for a similar progressive approach
to sexual-fraud claims).
100. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988)
(prohibiting employment discrimination on basis of sex); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
63-69 (1986) (ruling that Title VII prohibits acts of sexual harassment); Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. ch. 20,
§ 1510/50 (West 1993) (prohibiting employment discrimination on basis of sex at state level).
101. Larson, supra note 34, at 394 n.85.
102. See id.
103. Larson, supra note 34, at 382-83 & n.32. For a discussion of the seduction tort, see supra
note 54.
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the tort of seduction."' Correspondingly, suits involving claims of
seduction waned in number."°5 However, this trend is being reversed in
the latter half of the twentieth century. The seducion action is re-
emerging as "sexual fraud"-a new tort that regulates courtship by
promoting norms like frankness and honesty instead of Victorian gender
stereotypes1as
Similarly, earlier in this century, approximately three-quarters of
American jurisdictions adopted statutes that abolished common-law
marriages, 7 thereby venting moral contempt for couples who cohabit for
extended periods of time by denying them legal protections available to
those who formally wed." 8 In recent decades, however, many courts
have tempered the abolition of common-law marriages by applying other
common-law doctrines in innovative ways to pro:ect contract and
property interests of cohabitants," 9 thereby placing a cohabitant on a
plane more closely approximating that of a legally recognized spouse."0
In these "palimony" suits, courts often justify legal intervention by
noting that social attitudes about cohabitation have become more
relaxed.. and contending that a policy of non-interention into these
disputes often has the untoward effect of allowing one of the cohabitants
104. Larson, supra note 34, at 394; Karp & Karp, supra note 4, app. k (showing by chart that, as
of 1994, 19 states had abolished the seduction tort). See also Larson, supre note 34, at 401 & n.1 18
(asserting that the seduction tort clearly remains part of the common law in seventeen states and the
District of Columbia and its recognition is not statutorily barred in remaining states that have not
abolished the tort).
105. Larson, supra note 34, at 401.
106. See id. at 401-13.
107. See 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 2A, at 101-02 (noting that 37 states, either by statute or case
law, have abolished common-law marriage).
108. See id. at 120-22 (noting, but rejecting, arguments that common-law marriage was an
immoral institution).
109. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303
(Wis. 1987); 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 2.4, at 122-24; Weitzman, supra note 98, at 393-409; Carol S.
Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers'
Services, 10 Fam. L.Q. 101 (1976).
110. Courts that use contract law or equitable doctrines to support the claims of cohabitants are
careful to emphasize, however, that they do not consider themselves to be circumventing the
legislative prohibition of common-law marriages. See, e.g., Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122 n.24; Watts, 405
N.W.2d at 310 n.15. But, in rejecting claims by cohabitants, other courts have concluded that a grant
of relief would, in effect, revive the institution of common-law marriage. Se, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt,
394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207-09 (Ill. 1979); Cames v. Sheldon, 311 N.W.2d 747, 753 (Mich. Ct. App.
1981).
111. See Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122; Watts, 405 N.W.2d at 311.
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to retain a disproportionate share of assets accumulated through the joint
efforts of both parties."'
Given the social realities of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the breach-of-promise action probably addressed legitimate
harms suffered by the women who brought suits."' During this period,
the worth of women was largely defined by their prospects in the
marriage market rather than in the employment market."' And the
marriage market of this time, insofar as women were concerned, placed a
premium on youth and virginity. "' Typically, therefore, a woman had
much to lose when she relied on a promise of marriage, particularly in
cases where the promise was breached after a long engagement" 6 or
where, in recognition of the engagement, she succumbed to the sexual
advances of her prospective mate."17 Furthermore, attitudes regarding
divorce were starkly different from those prevalent today." 8 Once
entered into, marriage was viewed as a lifetime commitment." 9
Consequently, in contrast to modem "no-fault" approaches, divorces
were begrudgingly granted only upon establishing specific grounds; 2 °
and, when they were granted, awards to women generally reflected an
assumption that they deserved to be placed in the social and economic
position they would have been in had they remained married.'' Given
112. See Marvin, 557 P.2d at 121; Watts, 405 N.W.2d at 311-12.
113. See Coombs, supra note 39, at 9-11.
114. See id. at 9-10 (observing, among other things, that most American women of this period
depended on marriage for survival); Margaret F. Brinig, Rings and Promises, 6 J.L. Econ. & Organ.
203, 204 (1990) (noting that, until recently, marriage was the only career open to most women);
Coombs, supra note 39, at 11-13; Larson, supra note 34, at 397. The point made in the text is true
notwithstanding the early feminist condemnation of the breach-of-promise action for fostering
gender stereotypes. See Coombs, supra note 39, at 11-13; Larson, supra note 34, at 397.
115. See Brinig, supra note 114, at 204-05; Coombs, supra note 39, at 9-10.
116. Coombs, supra note 39, at 9.
117. Brinig, supra note 114, at 205 (noting that women who lost virginity suffered a loss in
"market value" and that, according to a 1948 Kinsey study, engaged women became sexually
intimate with their prospective mates half of the time); Coombs, supra note 39, at 9-10 (commenting
that, upon loss of chastity, a woman became "damaged goods" in the marriage market).
118. See 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 13.1, at 697-700; Weitzman, supra note 98, at 139-41.
119. See 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 13.1, at 697-700; Weitzman, supra note 98, at 139-41; Coombs,
supra note 39, at 3-4 n.15.
120. See I Clark, supra note 1, § 13.1, at 697-98; Coombs, supra note 39, at 3-4 n.15.
121. See Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62
Tul. L. Rev. 855, 873-74 & n.80 (emphasizing that, when a society provides women limited
opportunities for remarriage or economic support, they should be awarded damages measured by
their expectation interest in the marriage); Coombs, supra note 39, at 3-4 n.15 (noting that, in the
early twentieth century, a married woman was deemed "to have a legal claim ... on the man's
income stream for the rest of her life").
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what was at stake, the emergence of legal rules that provided similar
protection to women victimized by breached nuptial promises is not
surprising."2 In addition to compensating plaintiffs fo:r real injuries they
may have suffered, damage awards in breach-of-promise cases
encouraged men to take promises of marriage seriously and to invest
significantly in searching for, and determining compatibility with, a
prospective mate prior to entering into an engagement.7 3
By the late twentieth century, however, women have gained
significant access to the employment market. No longer are they almost
exclusively relegated to, and defined by, domestic roles." Furthermore,
after the sexual revolution, most men do not expect women to be
sexually inexperienced at the time nuptials take place.."s A prospective
bride's access to the marriage market is no longer significantly impaired
by virtue of having indulged in pre-marital sexual activity. 6 Also,
reflecting another radical shift in modem attitudes, all states have now
passed "no-fault" divorce laws, leaving either mate virually free to end a
marriage at any time. 7 Viewed from a modem perspective, a nuptial
promise is not a commitment to enter into a presumptively permanent
relationship.' Accordingly, when promises of mairiage are broken,
modem women do not sustain the same economic and social costs that
their predecessors sustained in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.
This is not to say, however, that breached promises to marry have
ceased to be a source of considerable harm. Even today, many people
suffer emotional devastation and outright humiliation upon the breakup
of what is perhaps the most intimate relationship short of marriage." 9
Moreover, even if one believes that people today marry for love rather
122. See Coombs, supra note 39, at 3-4 n.15.
123. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 246 (1992) (noting that, when costs of divorce are
prohibitive, parties will invest more in searching for a compatible mate). For a discussion of how
recovery based on the reliance interest would provide appropriate incentives for promises of
marriage to be taken seriously in modem society, see infra part IV.B.4.
124. See Weitzman, supra note 98, at 168-88 (detailing increasing partcipation of women in the
workplace and emergence of new norms for sharing responsibilities in marriage).
125. See Coombs, supra note 39, at 3-4 n.15.
126. See id.
127. Brinig & Carbone, supra note 121, at 867.
128. See Coombs, supra note 39, at 3-4 n.15.
129. See infra part IV.B.2 (finding that emotional anguish and humiliation are foreseeable
consequences of the breach of a promise to marry).
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than financial considerations,"30 promises to marry do not exist solely on
some spiritual plane separate from the worldly realm of economic
activity. In fact, on an annual basis, promises to marry are the wellspring
of a 30-billion dollar industry in the United States.' Statistics show that
in 1993 the average wedding in this country cost $15,500.132 When an
engaged party breaks a promise to marry, a prospective mate will often
have incurred significant costs preparing for a ceremony that will not
take place. It remains a social convention in this country for the bulk of
wedding expenses to be borne by the bride and her immediate family.
One, therefore, would expect a rule of law, such as a heartbalm statute,
that insulates parties from liability for dishonoring their nuptial promises
to have a disproportionately adverse financial impact on women.'
In part IV, promissory estoppel is adopted as the common-law theory
best suited for reformulating liability for breach of a promise to marry in
terms that reflect the mores and social realities of the late twentieth
century. Ideally, in applying promissory estoppel, recovery for breach of
a promise of marriage would be predicated on (and limited to) the
aggrieved party's reliance interest. Before proceeding with the
promissory-estoppel analysis, however, part III will detail the
relationship of the breach-of-promise action to general contract theory.
130. Of course, one of the arguments against the traditional breach-of-promise action was that it
approached matters of the heart as if they were property transactions, even though people nowadays
marry for love. See supra part I.C. Even today, however, it appears that financial considerations
often play a role in that complex phenomenon known as love. See Robert Wright, Our Cheating
Hearts, Time, Aug. 15, 1994, at 45, 50 (detailing research in evolutionary psychology suggesting
that human mating patterns, which have a genetic basis, are heavily influenced by socioeconomic
considerations).
131. See Denise Fields & Alan Fields, Bridal Bargains 4 (1995).
132. Cahners Research, Modern Bride's Consumer Council Survey: A Study of Engaged Women
2, 7 (1993). This figure includes the expense of an engagement ring, but does not take into account
expenditures by the couple on matters such as costs related to the honeymoon or by wedding guests
on gifts and travel. See id. See also Fields & Fields, supra note 131, at 5-6 (noting that average cost
of a formal wedding with 200 or more guests exceeds $18,000); Dateline NBC: Father of the Brides
(NBC television broadcast, Sept. 6, 1994) (interviewing wedding organizer who has planned
weddings costing "close to a million dollars").
133. The engagement ring, of course, is the major wedding-preparation expense traditionally
borne by men. See Cahmers Research, supra note 132, at 2, 7 (finding that average amount spent on
an engagement ring in 1993 was approximately $3000).
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III. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE BREACH-OF-PROMISE
ACTION TO GENERAL CONTRACT THEORY
In the nineteenth century, a theory of contract law emerged in
America that was based on the paradigm of market-exchange
transactions.' Under this contractual theory, a basic facet of English
contract law was modified by a requirement that consideration for a
promise be "bargained-for"; that is, it had to be something extracted by
the promisor (and given by the promisee) in exchange for the promise.1 35
Classical contract theory also incorporated other policies that were
viewed as being conducive to America's emerging market economy. For
instance, it was thought to be in the best interests of business that the
outcomes of cases involving contract issues be rather easily predictable
from basic first principles. 3 6 Hence, the contract law that emerged was
somewhat mechanical, marked by a preference for relatively rigid rules
over flexible standards. 3 7 Moreover, reflecting an underlying emphasis
on promoting free exchange, classical contract law was viewed almost
exclusively as a device for giving effect to the intentions of contracting
parties.'38 The role of courts deciding contract cases was to determine the
intent of the parties and to apply established rules in an ostensibly neutral
manner.139 Only when the process of agreement was marred in an
obvious way by the likes of fraud, duress, or undue influence, was it
appropriate for a court not to enforce the expressed intent of the parties
regarding their exchange.140 There was little roor in the classical
134. Such contract law is now widely referred to as "classical" contract law. See Charles Fried,
Contract as Promise 16 (1981); see also Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30
UCLA L. Rev. 829, 834-36, 850 (1983) [hereinafter Critical Approaches]; Samuel Williston,
Freedom of Contract, 6 Cornell L.Q. 365, 366-67 (1921).
135. See James D. Gordon III, A Dialogue About the Doctrine of Consideration, 75 Cornell L.
Rev. 987, 988 (1990) (discussing the elements of bargained-for considaration); see also Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 472 (1897) (claiming that the doctrine
of bargained-for consideration "is merely historical" in that it arises from contract law reflecting
commercial practice).
136. See Samuel Williston, Contracts § 23 (rev. ed. 1936) (stating that contract law is "founded
upon the fundamental principle of the security of business transactions').
137. See, e.g., Reuben M. Benjamin & A.J. Messing, Principles of the Law of Contract, passim
(2d ed. 1911) (one of the last classical contract law commercial treatises).
138. See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. Young's Adm'r, 90 U.S. 85, 106-8 (1874) ("This court has no
power to make . . . an agreement . . . . The requisite assent must be the work of the parties
themselves. The law cannot supply it for them. That is a function who'ly beyond the sphere of
judicial authority.").
139. See supra note 138.
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contract model for courts to take into account contextual fairness
considerations unrelated to the marketplace. 4' It was only deemed
appropriate for courts to impose their perceptions of fairness on parties in
the area of tort law, a completely separate common-law construct in
which the state, rather than each party, is the source of law. 2
The theoretical foundation for the traditional breach-of-promise action
is the premise that engaged parties enter into contracts when they, in
essence, exchange promises to marry. 4 3 As contract law became more
closely associated in the nineteenth century with market-exchange
transactions, the breach-of-promise action became somewhat anomalous.
Critics of the action charged that basing recovery for breach of nuptial
promises on contract theory was tantamount to imposing the morals of
business on personal relationships.'" Judges provided additional fodder
for critics by administering the action in ways that departed from
approaches taken in contract cases involving commercial parties.'45 For
example, a specific charge leveled against the breach-of-promise action
was that, as administered by courts, it smacked in many cases more of
tort than of contract,146 a serious accusation at a time there was supposed
to be a strict separation between the two great realms of common-law
liability. 7 In support of this particular claim, challengers noted that in
many jurisdictions, the damages available to victims of a breached
promise to marry exceeded those that would be awarded under a purely
contractual theory of recovery.4 8 Likewise, in many instances, the
140. See generally Sian E. Provost, A Defense of a Rights-Based Approach to Identifying
Coercion in Contract Law, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 629, 631 (1995) (noting that classical contract law
provided for setting aside coerced contracts).
141. See Robert L. Palmer, When Law Fails: Ethics, Commerce, and Tales of Value, 2 S. Cal.
Interdisciplinary L.J. 245, 261 (1993) (noting that classical contract law "had nothing to say about
the basic fairness of the deal").
142. Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 35, 43-50 (1974) (discussing the classical division
between contract and tort).
143. See supra part I.A.
144. See Grossberg, supra note 3, at 52-53 (quoting critic who lamented that breach-of-promise
action was causing engagements to be looked upon "as a matter of business alone"); Wright, supra
note 53, at 367 (stating that, by virtue of the breach-of-promise action, "human hearts are a subject
of merchandise, and agreements to marry a matter of trade and dicker").
145. See supra parts I.B-C.
146. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 49, 53-55 and accompanying text.
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evidentiary rules employed by courts in breach-of-promise actions
differed from those applied in ordinary contract actions.'49
Ironically, the same courts that developed the breach-of-promise
action have been chastised in other quarters for having been too rigid in
the way they administered general contract law. In retrospect, the breach-
of-promise action can be viewed, to some degree, as a harbinger of
modem (so-called "neoclassical") contract law. Under the neoclassical
approach, contract law is no longer perceived as being rigidly separated
from tort law.' Frequently, standards grounded in community norms of
decency, fairness, and reasonableness replaced the rigid rules that often
characterized classical contract law.' Prominent examples of this trend
are the resurgence of the doctrine of unconscionability'52 and the broad
recognition of a general duty of good faith and fair dealing."5 3 Moreover,
in applying these fairness considerations, modem courts are more willing
to adapt legal standards to take into account the nature of the relationship
between contracting parties."' Standards of behavior imposed by
contract law tend to be more exacting, for example, when parties are
involved in long-term relationships (in contrast to the prototypical one-
shot market exchange)."' 5 And, when parties are involved in special
relationships of trust and confidence, courts will often impose full-
149. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
150. See Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 3.6, at 118-21 (noting that modem contract law can be
viewed as imposing liability on a promisor who "through fault induced the [promisee] to believe that
there was a contract"); see also Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory
Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 Hofstra L. Rev. 443, 445 (1987) (stating
that modem contract law often "affords a remedy" for negligent promissory behavior).
151. Jay M. Feinman, The Meaning of Reliance: A Historical Perspective, 1984 Wis. L. Rev.
1373, 1389 (noting that the reliance theory of contracts permits courts to infuse contracts with
community values); Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance, and Improper Considerations: A
Common-Law Model for the Prohibition of Racial Discrimination in the Contracting Process, 62
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 183, 194 (1994) (commenting that "[mlodem contract law... recognizes that
persons contemplating or engaged in contractual relationships may be held responsible if they harm
others in ways that offend community standards of decency and fairness").
152. See generally Provost, supra note 140, at 631-33 (noting that the doctrine of
unconscionability permits the invalidation of contracts resulting from unequal bargaining power);
Williams, supra note 151, at 203-04 (citing general elements of unconscionability and describing
the doctrine as "a paradigmatic example of the behavior of contracting parties being openly and
explicitly subjected to community standards of fairness and decency").
153. Williams, supra note 151, at 206 (discussing duty of good faith and fair dealing as another
prime example of "contractual morality").
154. See Critical Approaches, supra note 134, at 829, 858-60 (notinlg that the modem law's
protection of reasonable expectations and reliance interests "represents... the free assumption by
social beings of the responsibility for others with whom they interact").
155. See Weitzman, supra note 98, at 243-44.
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fledged fiduciary duties upon them.' Since (as some courts have
recognized) engaged parties are in a special relationship of trust and
confidence,"5 7 it would be consistent with this general trend for the law to
attach some quantum of liability to the breach of a nuptial promise.
Classical contract law presupposed a world in which all of the actors
played on a level playing field and were, therefore, able to fend for
themselves without the need for state intervention.15 Neoclassical
contract law on the other hand, rooted in the social realities of the
twentieth century, is characterized by changes intended to redress some
of the inequities perceived to arise when parties in contractual
relationships have unequal power." 9 Nevertheless, the breach-of-promise
action shows that courts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, foreseeing their neoclassical counterparts, were willing to relax
the strictures of classical contract law in a category of cases where they
believed, based on the social realities of the time, that parties were not
usually on equal footing."6 In this instance, courts reformulated
common-law contract principles to cast the breach-of-promise action in
terms that acknowledged the social inequality of women and the extent
to which they were vulnerable when nuptial promises were broken.'
This focus on the harm caused by breaches of promises to marry is
also in keeping with a doctrinal shift that has taken place in modem
contract law. Many of the changes wrought by neoclassical contract law
are intended to protect the reliance interests of the parties. 62 Reliance on
a promise occurs when a promisee, presuming that a promise will be
honored, takes action that she otherwise would not have taken or refrains
156. See Kerry L. Macintosh, Gilmore Spoke Too Soon: Contract Rises from the Ashes of the Bad
Faith Tort, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 483,485,493 (1994) (explaining that the modem reliance theory of
contracts is premised upon the existence of a (quasi) fiduciary relationship between the promisor and
promisee).
157. See, e.g., White v. Prenzler, 131 N.E.2d 540, 543 (Ill. 1956); Weitzman, supra note 98, at
344-45.
158. See Williston, supra note 134, at 366-67.
159. See Feinman, supra note 151, at 1389 (noting that modem contract law makes it possible to
redress various inequities); Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 Yale
LJ. 763, 763 (1983) (observing that modem contract law protects "people from themselves by
limiting their capacity to make enforceable agreements of various kinds").
160. See Grossberg, supra note 3, at 38 (contending that the historical breach-of-promise action
illustrates "judicial recognition of the gap between the law's theoretical assumption of contracting
equality between men and women and the reality of feminine powerlessness").
161. See id.
162. See, e.g., Marefield Meadows, Inc. v. Lorenz, 427 S.E.2d 363, 365 (Va. 1993) (stating that
parties are "entitled" to rely on the contractual behavior of another); Williams, supra note 151, at
198-201.
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from taking action she otherwise would have taken.'6 A promisee's
reliance interest, in that case, can be viewed as a type of harm that
foreseeably results when a promise is made and broken."6 Modem
contract law's concern with protecting the reliance interest manifests
itself not only through developments related to bargain contract (the
lineal descendant of classical contract law), 6  but also through the
emergence of promissory estoppel as an independent theory of
obligation.16
6
One of the traditional objections to basing breach-of'promise recovery
on contract principles was that doing so threatened to impose the morals
of business on interpersonal relationships. 67 But, as previously
demonstrated, the courts that developed the breach-of-promise action did
not rigidly inject wholesale into the engagement context the rules of
classical contract law developed in cases involving commercial parties. 16S
The fear of subjecting engaged or married couples to the "morals of the
marketplace" was once also used by courts as grounds for invalidating
antenuptial agreements. 69 Many courts today are raore receptive to
antenuptial agreements, however, reasoning that neoclassical contract
doctrines such as unconscionability introduce standards of fair play into
intimate relationships that encourage parties to act responsibly.
170
Similarly, as part IV will demonstrate, liability appropriately imposed
under promissory estoppel can encourage responsible behavior by parties
who have made promises to marry, without opening the door to abuses
associated with the traditional breach-of-promise action.
163. See Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 90 (describing reliance as action or forbearance
induced by a promisee); Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 2.19, at 97-98 (stress;ing that reliance "cannot
consist of action or forbearance that would have occurred in any event').
164. Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 2.19, at 102.
165. See Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 71 (stating modem variant of the bargained-for
consideration requirement); Williams, supra note 151, at 198-201 (detailing developments in
bargain-contract theory related to the protection of reliance interests).
166. See generally Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory
Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 Rutgers L. Rev. 472, 5C 8-36 (1983).
167. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 158-161 and accompanying text.
169. See Weitzman, supra note 98, at 243.
170. See Weitzman, supra note 98, at 347-59. Professor Weitzman fulrt: er argues that, in light of
the protections provided by neoclassical contract doctrines, courts should continue to expand the
application of principles of modem contract law to personal relationships. Id. at 227-54.
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IV. A PROMISSORY-ESTOPPEL MODEL FOR IMPOSING
LIABILITY FOR BREACHES OF PROMISES TO MARRY
A. Promissory Estoppel, Section 90, and the Breach-of-Promise
Action
At about the time state legislatures began enacting the first wave of
heartbalm statutes, the drafters of the Restatement of Contracts (First
Restatement) revolutionized contract law by detailing in section 90171 a
general reliance-based theory of obligation that has become popularly
known as promissory estoppel.'72 American jurisdictions have embraced
section 90 with an alacrity that has made it, in the words of Professor E.
Allan Farnsworth, the First Restatement's "most notable and influential
rule."' In a slightly revised format, section 90 is incorporated in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Second Restatement):
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding
if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
(2) A charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is binding
under Subsection (1) without proof that the promise induced action
or forbearance.174
As is the case with the traditional breach-of-promise action, 75 section
90 can be characterized as a hybrid of contract and tort principles.
1 76
171. Section 90 of the First Restatement states: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the
promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise." Restatement of Contracts § 90 (1932) [hereinafter First
Restatement].
172. Professor Williston's invocation of the term "promissory estoppel" in his legendary treatise
is generally regarded as the springboard for the popular use of the term. See I Samuel Williston, The
Law of Contracts § 139 nn.23-24 (1st ed. 1920); Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 2.19, at 95 n.23;
Michael Gibson, Promissory Estoppel, Article 2 of the U.C.C., and The Restatement (Third) of
Contracts, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 659, 668 n.75 (1988).
173. Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 2.19, at 95. See also Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised
Restatement: The Proliferation ofPromissory Estoppel, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 52, 53 (1981) (describing
section 90 as "perhaps the most radical and expansive development of this century in the law of
promissory liability").
174. Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 90.
175. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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Section 90 is contractual in the sense that it provides for a promisee to be
given a remedy when a promise that satisfies certain requirements is
breached.'7 Yet, promissory estoppel also can be analogized to the
imposition of tort liability for negligence: we are, as pointed out above,
essentially holding the promisor responsible for the foreseeable harm
(reasonably expected reliance) caused by her actionable conduct
(promise making and promise breaking). 171 Moreover, reflecting
promissory estoppel's roots in equity, 179 section 90 ties both the
recognition of liability and the consequent award of damages to
considerations of justice, 80 thereby openly inviting courts to take into
account all relevant fairness and policy considerations in determining
whether their decisions advance the interests of justice under the
circumstances in which particular promises are made. 8'
176. See Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 2.19, at 102; Barnett & Becker, supra note 150, at 445-46
(noting that promissory estoppel provides a bridge between contract and tort law).
177. See Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 1 (defining a contract as "a promise... for the
breach of which the law gives a remedy'). But see, e.g., Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306
N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981) (stating that the "effect" of promissory estoppel "is to imply a
contract in law where none exists in fact); sources cited infra note 179 (noting that some courts
consider promissory estoppel to be equitable rather than contractual).
178. Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 2.19, at 102; Williams, supra note 151, at 195. See also John D.
Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 6-1, at 273 (3d ed. 1987) (emphasizing
importance of the role of injury as theoretical basis for enforcing promise under promissory
estoppel).
179. See Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 90 cmt. a (stating that promissory estoppel is an
extension of equitable estoppel); Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 2.19, at 95 (describing process by
which promissory estoppel evolved from equitable estoppel). Some courts consider promissory
estoppel to be equitable rather than contractual. See, e.g., Swerhun v. General Motors, 812 F. Supp.
1218, 1222 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (describing promissory estoppel as "an equitable remedy); Division of
Labor Law Enforcement v. Transpacific Transp. Co., 137 Cal. Rptr. 855, 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)
(referring to "the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel").
180. Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 90 (providing that promise "h. binding if injustice can
be avoided only by [its] enforcement" and that any "remedy granted for b.-each may be limited as
justice requires').
181. See Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 90 cmt. b (delineating some of the fairness
considerations relevant to determining the extent to which enforcement is necessary to avoid
injustice). Section 90's call to justice is necessarily open-ended. The pertinent fairness
considerations, as well as the relative weight to be accorded them, will necessarily vary in different
contexts. See id.; Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (ruling that a court
applying section 90 may, but is not required to, take into account the impact of the decision on
polices underlying the First Amendment). For a discussion of the policy considerations relevant to
determining the damages that should be awarded for breach of a promise to marry, see infra part
IV.B.
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When promissory estoppel first gained prominence, reliance was
viewed essentially as a substitute for consideration:8 2 having induced the
promisee's reliance, the promisor was estopped from asserting that the
promisee provided no consideration for the promise.8 3 By allowing a
promise to be enforced on the basis of unbargained-for reliance, section
90 marks a radical departure from the market-exchange paradigm that
was at the heart of classical contract law."8 4 Accordingly, shortly after the
adoption of section 90, some courts felt that the application of the
doctrine should be limited to situations in which promises had been made
gratuitously. 85 The proponents of this view felt that it was inappropriate
to use promissory estoppel when parties were bargaining with one
another, that is, when the promisor was seeking consideration in
exchange for her promise.8
6
The First Restatement, however, placed no explicit limitations on the
sphere of section 90 vis-A-vis the bargain requirement of section 75.187 In
applying section 90, many courts have not restricted themselves solely to
situations involving gratuitous promises.88  Even when parties
contemplate bargain relationships in cases like Drennan v. Star Paving
Co., '9 courts nevertheless have used promissory estoppel as a basis for
182. See Knapp, supra note 173, at 53 & n.12. Some courts still view promissory estoppel as
being a consideration substitute. See, e.g., State Bank of Standish v. Curry, 476 N.W.2d 635, 637
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that "[p]romissory estoppel substitutes for the consideration necessary
to form a contract in cases where there are no mutual promises"), rev'din part on other grounds, 500
N.W.2d 104 (Mich. 1993).
183. See, e.g., Ricketts v. Scothom, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898); Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 2.19,
at 94-95 (discussing Ricketts).
184. See Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 2.19, at 94-96; Gilmore, supra note 142, at 66, 72; Knapp,
supra note 173, at 53.
185. See, e.g., James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344,345-46 (2d Cir. 1933) (Hand,
J.); Gilmore, supra note 142, at 66, 130 n.150.
186. See, e.g., Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d at 345-46; Gilmore, supra note 142, at 66, 130 n.150.
187. Compare First Restatement, supra note 171, § 75 (describing bargain requirement) with id.
§ 90 (describing reliance-based liability). See Gilmore, supra note 142, at 64, 70-72 (discussing
open relationship in the First Restatement between section 90 and the bargain principle); Knapp,
supra note 173, at 53 (noting that section 90 in the First Restatement was not expressly limited to
situations where it served as a substitute for consideration).
Section 71 of the Second Restatement is the analog to section 75 of the First Restatement. See
Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 71 (stating that consideration must be bargained for). The
comments to section 90 in the Second Restatement, however, appear to contemplate its being used in
situations where parties are in a bargain relationship. See Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 90
cmts. b, e; Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and
the "Invisible Handshake", 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 903, 907 n.16 (1985).
188. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 187, at 907 & nn.16-18.
189. 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958).
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rendering bids (which are offers) by subcontractors irrevocable when
general contractors rely on them in a substantial manner.90 In other
scenarios, courts have used promissory estoppel to protect the reliance
interests of parties who contemplated, but failed to enter into, contractual
relationships.19' Furthermore, courts routinely address the possibility of
recovery under either bargain contract or promissory estoppel,
particularly in situations in which recovery under bargain theory is
barred for some reason.
192
Even though engaged parties may be considered to have entered into
bargain-contracts, an examination of cases involving prospective
employment-at-will relationships illustrates why it would, nevertheless,
be appropriate for a court to use promissory estoppel to grant relief for
the breach of a nuptial promise. Each of the cases involves a plaintiff and
a defendant who exchanged promises to enter into an a.--will employment
relationship on some later date.' 93
Typically, the plaintiff proceeded to rely on the defendant's promise
of employment by resigning her current position, among other things,
only to be devastated when the defendant denied her the opportunity to
190. Id. at 764. For a description of exactly how the Supreme Court of California applied
promissory estoppel to render subcontractor's bid irrevocable, see Williams, supra note 15 1, at 200.
See also Metzger & Phillips, supra note 166, at 513-21 (discussing generally Drennan and other
subcontractor bid cases). The rule of Drennan is generalized in section 87(2) of the Second
Restatement. See Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 87(2).
191. See, e.g., Elvin Assocs. v. Franklin, 735 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (ruling that popular
entertainer was liable for damages incurred by plaintiff in reliance on her oral assurances, even
though an agreement was never finalized); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis.
1965) (holding franchisor liable for prospective franchisee's damages incarred in reliance on oral
assurances, even though negotiations collapsed). See also Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian
Corp., 884 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1989) (recognizing that promissory estoppel might serve as a basis for
requiring parties to negotiate in good faith); Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 3.26, at 206-08
(discussing Red Owl).
192. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203-05 (Minn. 1990) (considering
possibility of recovery under promissory estoppel, even though court held there was no valid bargain
contract because parties lacked "intent to contract"), rev'd on other grounds, 501 U.S. 663 (1991);
Farber & Matheson, supra note 187, at 908 & nn.19-20 (noting that coLrts often bypass bargain
contract analysis and rely "instead on promissory estoppel even when no apparent barrier exists to
[bargain contract) recovery"); Metzger & Phillips, supra note 166, at 512 & nn.260-63 (noting,
among other things, that bargain contract and promissory estoppel counis are often plead in the
alternative and considered separately by courts).
193. See Ravelo v. County of Hawaii, 658 P.2d 883 (Haw. 1983); Grouse v. Group Health Plan,
Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981); Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975). See also
Bower v. AT&T Techs., 852 F.2d 361, 363-65 (8th Cir. 1988) (ruling promissory estoppel
applicable to promise to rehire on at-will basis employees whose positions were phased out). But see
White v. Roche Biomedical Labs, 807 F. Supp. 1212, 1217-20 (D.S.C. 1992) (declining to follow
Grouse), aft'd, 998 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1993).
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begin work.'94 A bargain-contract approach to these cases is complicated
by the at-will nature of the contemplated employment relationships.195 In
theory, the defendant, if it had allowed the prospective employee to
begin work, could have fired her immediately with impunity.'96 Thus, as
one court recognized, the real harm incurred by the disappointed
employee is not the frustration of her expectations'97 with regard to the
prospective job, but the losses she incurred "in quitting the job [she]
held."'98 In these situations, courts have turned to promissory estoppel to
award damages based on the extent of the plaintiff's reliance interest. 99
Under modem no-fault divorce statutes, either party to a marriage has,
in essence, the right to end it at any time.200 Modem marriages are
therefore tantamount to contractual relationships that are terminable at
will,2 ' and exchanges of promises to marry can be likened to exchanges
of promises to enter into at-will employment arrangements. By reference,
the cases discussed in the previous paragraph establish that the basis for
granting a remedy for the breach of a nuptial promise should not be the
aggrieved party's expectancy, but the costs incurred by the aggrieved
party in relying on a broken nuptial promise. It follows, then, that section
90 may appropriately be applied in cases involving broken promises to
marry.
In part IV.B, section 90 is employed in a systematic re-examination of
the damages traditionally awarded at common law when a promise to
marry is broken. In jurisdictions that retain the breach-of-promise action,
only the Washington Supreme Court, in Stanard v. Bolin,202 has
194. In Grouse, the plaintiff also declined a job offer from another employer in reliance on the
defendant's promise of employment. 306 N.W.2d at 115-16. Similarly, in Ravelo, the prospective
employee's wife relied on the promise by quitting her job. 658 P.2d at 885. The Ravelo court ruled
that the wife's reliance interest was also protected under section 90. Id. at 887-88.
195. See Grouse, 306 N.W.2d at 116.
196. Id.; Ravelo, 658 P.2d at 886 (noting that Ravelo was a "probationary employee").
197. Because of the at-will nature of the prospective employment relationship, the plaintiff's
expectation interest could not be measured with reasonable certainty, a prerequisite to the recovery
of expectation damages for breach of a bargain contact. See Second Restatement, supra note 22,
§ 352 (requiring that damages be proved with reasonable certainty). See supra part IV.B.1
(concluding that expectation damages should not be available for breach of a promise to marry).
198. Grouse, 306 N.W.2d at 116.
199. See id.; Ravelo, 658 P.2d at 887-88; Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952, 953-54 (Colo. Ct. App.
1975).
200. Posner, supra note 123, at 264; Coombs, supra note 39, at 3-4 n.15.
201. Posner, supra note 123, at 264 (noting that "no-fault divorce converts a marriage that
produces no children into a contract of marriage terminable at will").
202. 88 Wash. 2d 614,565 P.2d 94(1977).
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attempted a comparable review of the damages available for breach of a
nuptial promise.2 3 The Stanard court approached the breach-of-promise
action as a sort of common-law pariah, describing it at one point as being
"quasi-contract, quasi-tort."2" With the emergence of promissory
estoppel, however, it is no longer necessary for courts to recognize a
separate breach-of-promise action. Through thoughtful application of the
liability principles set out in section 90, courts can bring the treatment of
promises to marry into the mainstream of common-law jurisprudence.
B. Damages for Breach of Promise To Marry Under Section 90
This part of the Article uses section 90 to re-evaluate the major types
of damages awarded under the traditional breach-of-promise action.05 In
the course of this review, conclusions are drawn about the extent, if any,
to which a particular type of recovery remains appropriate in the late
twentieth century, given that damages under section 90 should be
"limited as justice requires.""0 6 The latter directive is particularly
important because, as will be illustrated, it enables courts to give proper
consideration to contemporary social attitudes and the goals of modem
contract law.207 Again, for the reasons that follow, the liability of parties
who breach promises to marry should be measured by, and limited to, the
reliance costs reasonably incurred by the party to whom they were
engaged.
1. Expectation Damages
Under the traditional breach-of-promise action, a jilted party was
entitled, among other things, to damages aimed at corapensating her for
the loss of the financial and social position she would have been in had
the marriage taken place.08 In jurisdictions that have not legislatively
abolished the breach-of-promise action, only one court to date has ruled
that expectation damages should not be available to a party aggrieved by
a breached promise to marry. In Stanard v. Bolin,C9 the Washington
203. See infra notes 209-13, 242-43 and accompanying text.
204. 88 Wash. 2d at 622, 565 P.2d at 98.
205. See supra part I.B (detailing damages awarded by courts in breach-of-promise cases).
206. Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 90.
207. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (emphasizing that, in awarding damages under
section 90, courts should take into account a broad range of fairness considerations).
208. See supra part I.B.
209. 88 Wash. 2d 614,565 P.2d 94 (1977).
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Supreme Court justified its denial of expectation damages recovery
(while leaving the action otherwise intact) by emphasizing that society
no longer views marriages as "property transactions." '21 It is true that
marriages are no longer broadly perceived in American society as
appropriate instruments for building financial coalitions between
families.2 With the triumph of the norm of companionate marriage,
people nowadays presumably become engaged and marry for love. 2
But, in and of itself, this consideration does not present a sufficiently
clear and compelling basis for disallowing expectation damages in cases
involving broken nuptial promises. After all, there is no rule of modem
contract law that limits liability for broken promises to those that
constitute "property transactions. ' 2 3 Using promissory estoppel, modem
contract theory, and some of the considerations previously mentioned in
this Article, one can develop a richer and fuller explanation than is given
in Stanard for denying expectation damages to someone who has been
aggrieved by a breached promise to marry.
Even though a promisee's reliance provides the theoretical basis for
enforcing a promise under promissory estoppel, it does not necessarily
follow that reliance, rather than expectation, damages should be awarded
in all such cases. 4 Indeed, Professor Williston, the reporter of the First
Restatement, believed that any promise determined to be binding under
section 90 should be enforced as made; that is, expectation damages
should be awarded.2 5 He consequently grafted into the original version
of section 90 a requirement that reliance be "definite and substantial," '216
lest a promisee's trivial acts of reliance give rise to a claim for full-blown
expectation damages.21 7  The drafters of the Second Restatement,
210. Id. at 620, 565 P.2d at 97. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (discussing the fact
that, when the breach-of-promise action first gained prominence, marriages were often arranged
affairs based on financial settlements).
211. 88 Wash. 2d at 620,565 P.2d at 97.
212. See supra notes 79-80. But see supra note 130 (noting that financial and social
considerations may still play an indirect role in determining whether many people fall in love).
213. Cf Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 71 (imposing requirement that promise be
supported by bargained-for consideration, but not explicitly requiring an exchange of property); id.
§ 90 (basing recovery on reasonably expected "action or forbearance").
214. See Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 2.19, at 100-01; Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The
Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 Yale L.J. 111, 129-30 (1991).
215. Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 2.19, at 99-100; Yorio & Thel, supra note 214, at 116-23.
216. First Restatement, supra note 171, § 90.
217. See Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 2.19, at 97 n.29. Moreover, when a promisor can
reasonably expect a promise to induce definite and substantial reliance, she should seriously reflect
before making it. See Yorio & Thel, supra note 214, at 124.
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however, felt differently: since the basis of enibrcement was a
promisee's reliance, they reasoned, a court should be given the discretion
to limit damages to the promisee's reliance interest-the cost she
incurred by relying on the breached promise." 8 Therefbre, in the Second
Restatement, the drafters open the door to partial enforcement of a
promise by deleting from section 90 the requirement that reliance be
"definite and substantial""2 9 and by adding thereto the provision allowing
remedies to be "limited as justice requires."20 Despite this revision,
however, recent analyses show that courts continue to award expectation
damages in most cases decided under section 90."
However, in instances where expectation damages cannot be measured
with reasonable certainty, there is general agreement among
commentators that an award of reliance damages under promissory
estoppel is appropriate.2" The cases involving a prospective employer's
anticipatory breach of a promise of at-will employment fit this pattern.'
As shown, courts in these cases have recognized that the prospective
employee's expectancy cannot be calculated because of the at-will nature
of the employment contract into which the parties entered. 4
Nevertheless, they have deemed it appropriate to award reliance damages
to the prospective employee."
Since no-fault divorce statutes have essentially rendered modem
marriage the equivalent of an at-will contract, the expectancy of a party
aggrieved by a broken promise to marry is also incapable of
measurement with reasonable certainty. 6 By analogy, then, reliance
218. Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 90 cmt. d; Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 2.19, at 100-
01; Farber & Matheson, supra note 187, at 909; Knapp, supra note 173, at 55-58.
219. First Restatement, supra note 171, § 90.
220. Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 90.
221. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 187, at 909; Yorio & Thel, supra note 214, at 131-32.
222. See Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 2.19, at 101 & n.43; Barnett & Eecker, supra note 150, at
478-8 1; Yorio & Thel, supra note 214, at 149-50.
223. See supra part IV.A.
224. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 197. Since under a no-fault regime a "man can marry on Monday and divorce
on Tuesday," Professor Coombs argues that in modem society "damages for a mere broken
engagement would make no sense." Coombs, supra note 39, at 3-4 n.15. Again, however, an
analogy to the cases involving anticipatory repudiations of promises of at-will employment is useful.
In Grouse v. Group Health Plan, 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981), the court stated that the plaintiff
"had a right to assume he would be given a good faith opportunity to perform his duties to the
[defendant's] satisfaction... once he was on the job." Id. at 116. Apparently, therefore, the Grouse
court would still have awarded the plaintiff reliance damages under section 90 had the defendant
waited and fired plaintiff soon after he commenced performance. Under such circumstances, the
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(rather than expectation) damages should be awarded under promissory
estoppel for breach of a promise to marry.'"
Further support for denying recovery of expectation damages in this
context can be marshalled by analyzing broken promises to marry from a
market perspective. One of the components of the reliance interest is the
injured party's "forbearance"'--that is, those opportunities she has
foregone by relying on a promise. 9 In a competitive market setting,
those foregone opportunities will include any opportunity the aggrieved
party might have had to enter into a contract with someone other than the
breaching party, on terms comparable to those contained in the breached
contract."0 When this is the case, the best way to provide full protection
to an aggrieved party's reliance interest is to award expectation
defendant would still not have afforded the plaintiff "a good faith opportunity to perform his duties
to the [defendant's] satisfaction." Id.
By analogy, if a party were to marry someone on Monday and, without cause, were to divorce
them on Tuesday, the promise to marry has been effectively breached. Implicit in a promise to marry
is that, if parties go through with the wedding ceremony, each party will give the other a good faith
opportunity to make the marriage work. Many courts apply modem divorce statutes in ways that
protect divorcing parties' reliance interests. See Brinig & Carbone, supra note 121, at 870-72.
Therefore, in the sham marriage described by Professor Coombs, a divorce court should enter an
order that fully protects the reliance interest of the aggrieved spouse, including expenditures wasted
on the wedding ceremony.
Boyd v. Boyd, 39 Cal. Rptr. 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964), presented a situation similar to Professor
Coombs' scenario. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant left her two days after marrying her. Id. at
401. As a result of having gone through the ceremony, she lost her eligibility to receive two
governmental stipends. Id. The court recognized that, even though the defendant participated in the
wedding ceremony, the gist of the plaintiff's complaint was that he breached his promise to marry
her. Id. at 402. As the court observed: "A breach of promise is a failure to do what one promises to
do. Whether the defendant makes a promise 'of marriage' or 'to marry,' he contracts not only to
undergo a marriage ritual but also to fulfill matrimonial obligations and expectations." Id.
Unfortunately for the plaintiff in Boyd, the court found that, although she had a claim for breach of a
promise to marry, it was barred by the California heartbalm statute. Id. at 402-05.
227. By contrast, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the law considered marriage to
be a lifetime commitment. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. Therefore, it was
theoretically possible to calculate the expectation interest of a woman aggrieved by the breach of
promise to marry: she was entitled to damages that would put her in the financial and social position
she would have been in had she become married and remained married. See supra notes 121-22 and
accompanying text. Through the breach-of-promise action, an engaged woman, in essence, was
granted the rights of a spouse. See Coombs, supra note 39, at 3-4 n.15.
228. See Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 90.
229. Edward J. Murphy & Richard E. Speidel, Studies in Contract Law 245-46 (4th ed. 1991);
Brinig & Carbone, supra note 121, at 870-71; L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1 & 2), 46 Yale L.J. 52,373 (1936).
230. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 229, at 60-61; Brinig & Carbone, supra note 121, at 871 &
n.72.
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damages." It is for this reason that expectation damages are generally
awarded for breach of a bargain contract. 2
Marriage can itself be viewed as a contract,233 and the choices that
people make with regard to marriage can be subjected to a market
analysis."M It follows then, that the case for awa-rding expectation
damages would be more compelling if it could be convincingly argued
that parties aggrieved by breached nuptial promises should be
compensated for the possibility that they may have passed up other
marital opportunities. 5 Under conditions prevalent in. the late twentieth
century, this argument cannot be made persuasively. In most cases today,
a jilted party's access to the marriage market will not be substantially
compromised as a result of having been aggrieved by a breached promise
to marry. 6 Today, a party who is capable of attracting another mate at
the time she enters into an ill-fated engagement generally should not be
significantly less able to do so as a result of the termination of that
engagement.
Admittedly however, this may not have been true under the conditions
that prevailed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As earlier
noted, the jurists that developed the breach-of-promise action appear to
have been motivated, in part, by a belief that broken engagements often
severely damaged the prospects of women in a marriage market that
highly valued female youth and virginity. 7 The dilemma of these
women was further exacerbated by their limited access to the
employment markets of that earlier time. 8 Under these conditions, the
award of expectation damages to parties aggrieved by broken nuptial
promises would be justified.
In applying section 90, a court might also take into consideration the
fact that the availability of expectation damages, to a certain degree,
231. See Murphy & Speidel, supra note 229, at 246; Fuller & Perdu,, supra note 229, at 61;
Brinig & Carbone, supra note 121, at 871-72.
232. See Murphy & Speidel, supra note 229, at 246; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 229, at 61;
Brinig & Carbone, supra note 121, at 872.
233. See generally Weitzman, supra note 98, at 1-134 (setting out terms of the traditional
marriage contract).
234. See generally Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on the Family 66-92 (19:31) (conducting economic
analysis of mating in marriage markets).
235. Cf. Brinig & Carbone, supra note 121, at 873 (stating that, earlier in our history, "a [married]
traditional woman's most important loss was the opportunity to have married another').
236. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 115-17, 161 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 114.
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actually validated the perception that damage awards in breach-of-
promise cases were usually excessive and facilitated "blackmail" by
unscrupulous plaintiffs."9 If promissory estoppel were to be used to limit
recovery to an aggrieved party's reliance interest, however, possibilities
for that kind of abuse would be significantly curtailed.
2. Damages for Emotional Anguish and Humiliation
The availability of damages for emotional anguish and humiliation is
another controversial feature of breach-of-promise litigation.24 Over the
last twenty years, there have been several reported cases that explicitly
confirm the continued availability of these types of damages in
jurisdictions that retain the breach-of-promise action in some form.24 ' In
two of those cases, courts have extensively discussed their rulings. The
Washington Supreme Court ruled in Stanard v. Bolin242 that damages for
mental anguish and humiliation would continue to be available to breach-
of-promise plaintiffs at common law on grounds that these types of
damages were "foreseeable" consequences of the breach of a promise to
marry.243 Again, in Wildey v. Springs,24  a 1994 case interpreting the
239. See supra part I.C.
240. See supra part I.B. Judges and commentators use a variety of different terms to describe
emotional anguish and humiliation. Emotional anguish, for example, may sometimes be called
"mental anguish," "mental distress," "emotional distress," or "psychological injury." Sometimes
humiliation may be referred to as "loss of reputation." In modem society, a breach of a promise to
marry probably does not cause the stigmatic injury that it once may have when people were less
mobile and communities were more closely knit. Accordingly, one must believe today that the
primary component of humiliation (or loss of reputation) is psychological. Without regard to the
labels used by a particular court or commentator, the ensuing discussion will treat emotional anguish
and humiliation as being similar psychological phenomena.
241. See Wildey v. Springs, 840 F. Supp. 1259, 1267-68 (N.D. Il. 1994), rev'd on other grounds,
47 F.3d 1475 (7th Cir. 1995); Glass v. Wiltz, 551 So. 2d 32, 32-34 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (ruling that
damages for mental anguish and humiliation are recoverable under Louisiana law, but finding
plaintiff's proof to be inadequate); Menhusen v. Dake, 334 N.W.2d 435, 436-37 (Neb. 1983)
(refusing to reconsider availability of damages for mental suffering and humiliation when breach-of-
promise action was barred by parties' cohabitation); Bradley v. Somers, 322 S.E.2d 665, 666-67
(S.C. 1984) (discussing continued viability of traditional breach-of-promise action, including
availability of emotional distress damages, in South Carolina); Kuhlman v. Cargile, 262 N.W.2d
454, 459-60 (Neb. 1978) (noting continued availability of damages for mental suffering and
humiliation caused by breach of promise to marry, but ruling that plaintiff's evidence was inadequate
to support her claim with regard to these elements); Stanard v. Bolin, 88 Wash. 2d 614, 620-21, 565
P.2d 94, 97-98 (1977). Wildey and Stanard are discussed in the ensuing text.
242. 88 Wash. 2d 614,565 P.2d 94 (1977).
243. Id. at 620-21, 565 P.2d at 97-98. The Washington Supreme Court sanctioned the award of
damages for emotional anguish and humiliation under a tort theory. Id. at 620, 565 P.2d at 97. The
award of these types of damages on a foreseeability basis, however, can be squared with contract
1053
Washington Law Review Vol. 70:1019, 1995
Illinois Breach of Promise Act,24 a federal district court sustained a jury
verdict that awarded a plaintiff $118,000 for the mental pain and
suffering she went through when the defendant broke off an
engagement.246 The district court ruled that, for purposes of the Illinois
statute, the plaintiff's psychological injuries constituted "actual
damages" caused by the defendant's breach of the nuptial promise. 47
theory. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854); Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183,
188-89 (Mass. 1973); Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 353 (requiring that damages for
emotional disturbance be foreseeable as "a particularly likely result" of a breach of contract). For a
recent discussion of the recoverability of emotional distress damages for breach of contract, see
Douglas J. Whaley, Paying for the Agony: The Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages in Contract
Actions, 26 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 935 (1992). However, some courts are unwilling to apply the
foreseeability framework in a contract context with respect to the award of damages for emotional
anguish. See Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 12.17, at 934-35. Professor Whaley has suggested that the
failure of these courts to pursue a foreseeability analysis is often grounded in "sloppy analysis, bad
policy, and results that are indefensible using a 'person on the street' fairness test." Whaley, supra,
at 954. Nevertheless, for the unique policy reasons explored in the text, courts should not award
emotional-anguish damages for the breach of a promise to many.
244. 840 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ill. 1994), rev'd, 47 F.3d 1475 (7th Cir. 1995). See infra note 247
for details about the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that reversed the
district court's decision on grounds unrelated to the focus of discussion in the ensuing text.
245. Il. Comp. Stat. Ann. ch. 740, §§ 1511-1515.
246. Wildey, 840 F. Supp. at 1266-69. The jury award included a provi3ion of $25,000 to cover
the medical expenses attendant to the treatment of plaintiff's mental anguish. Id. at 1268-69.
247. The Illinois Breach of Promise Act limits damages recoverable fcr "breach of promise or
agreement to marry... to the actual damages sustained as a result of the irjury complained of." I11.
Comp. Stat. Ann. ch. 740, § 15/2. Some confusion with regard to the breadth of this provision arises,
however, because the statute's statement of purpose contains an assenion that "the award of
monetary damages ... is ineffective as a recompense for genuine mental or emotional distress." Id.
§ 15/1. Relying on Smith v. Hill, 147 N.E.2d 321, 325 (Ill. 1958), the district court in Wildey
concluded that this general assertion in the statement of purpose did not bar recovery of damages for
mental anguish caused by breach of a promise to marry. 840 F. Supp. at 1267. These damages are
recoverable in an Illinois breach-of-promise case, the district court concluded, "as long as they are
meant to compensate the plaintiff for actual damages suffered and are not meant to punish the
defendant or inflate the recovery." Id.
The language in the statement of purpose in the Illinois Breach of Promise Act tracks similar
language used in the statements of purpose of a number of state statutes that abolished the breach-of-
promise action altogether, thus betraying the fact that the original version of the Illinois statute
likewise provided for the abolition (rather than the limitation) of the action. In Heck v. Schupp, 68
N.E.2d 464 (ill. 1946), the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated the original version of the statute
because it was at odds with a provision of the Illinois Constitution that required "every person" to be
given "a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he rray receive in his person,
property or reputation." Id. at 466. In further justification of its decision, the Illinois Supreme Court
opined that a complete abolition of the breach-of-promise action would have the effect of placing "a
premium on the violation of moral law, making those who violate the law a privileged class, free to
pursue a course of conduct without fear of punishment even to the extent of a suit for damages." Id.
In response to the decision in Heck, the Illinois legislature in 1947 enacted the current version of
Illinois Breach of Promise Act, which limited the scope of recoverable damages and also added a
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Notwithstanding the fact that emotional anguish and humiliation may
be actual and foreseeable consequences of a broken promise to marry,
damages for emotional anguish and humiliation should not be awarded to
breach-of-promise plaintiffs under promissory estoppel. Since section 90
directs that the remedy for breach be limited "as justice requires,"24 a
court applying section 90 should take into account the particular setting
in which a promise was made and all policy considerations relevant to an
award of a particular type of damages.249 With regard to matters such as
emotional distress and humiliation, the setting in which promises to
marry are made should be differentiated from other situations in which
promises have been breached. In a typical situation, emotional anguish
results from the breach of the promise. However, in situations involving
breaches of promises to marry, emotional distress may result from both
rather stringent notice requirement. See Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. ch. 740, § 15/2 (limiting damages
recovery to "actual damages"); id. § 1514-1515 (imposing notice requirement).
After the district court's decision in Wildey, a group in the Illinois House of Representatives
proposed new legislation, H.B. 4055 (1994), for the complete abolition of the breach-of-promise
action in the state. The proposed statute died, however, because of renewed concerns about the
constitutionality of abolishing the action and fears that the statute was, in effect, "special legislation
relating to a recent case." Ill. Legis. Info. Sys., HB 4055 (1994).
In early 1995, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's opinion in
Wildey on grounds unrelated to the determination that damages for mental anguish constituted actual
damages for purposes of the Illinois Breach of Promise Act. Wildey v. Springs, 47 F.3d 1475 (7th
Cir. 1995). In light of the antipathy that the Illinois legislature felt for the breach-of-promise action
in 1947, the court of appeals concluded that it would have intended for the notice requirement
imposed by the Illinois Breach of Promise Act to be construed strictly. Id. at 1485-89. The suit,
accordingly, was dismissed on grounds that plaintiff's notice was defective in that it failed to state
"the date upon which the promise or agreement to marry was made.' Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. ch. 740,
§ 15/4.
Since the court of appeals disposed of Wildey on the issue of notice, it did not address the district
court's conclusion that damages for mental anguish constituted actual damages for purposes of the
Illinois Breach of Promise Act. As a matter of straight statutory interpretation, the district court
undoubtedly is correct. Money, according to the statute's statement of purpose, may be ineffective
recompense for "genuine mental or emotional distress." Ill. Comp. Stat Ann. ch. 740, § 15/1. On the
other hand, how could "genuine mental or emotional distress" not qualify as "actual damages"? The
failure of the Illinois legislature to amend the statute after considering the district court's ruling in
Wildey, moreover, gives rise to an inference of legislative acquiescence to that ruling. To the extent,
however, the reach of the Illinois Breach of Promise Act is to be measured by reference to the hostile
attitudes prevailing in the Illinois legislature in 1947 (as the court of appeals suggests in Wildey), one
can argue that the members of that body wanted to exclude mental-anguish damages (despite their
poor choice of language). See Vann v. Vehrs, 633 N.E.2d 102, 104 (Il1. App. Ct. 1994) (suggesting
in dictum that Illinois legislature in Breach of Promise Act intended to abolish "damages for mental
and emotional distress").
248. Section 90 dictates that a court limit the remedy granted for breach "as justice requires."
Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 90.
249. See supra part IV.A.
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the breach as well as the performance of the promises." Indeed, the
emotional distress which may be caused if the marriage takes place
could, in fact, be substantially greater than would be caused by the
broken engagement. In that instance, the heartbreak a jilted party suffers
as a consequence of a broken nuptial promise most likely will be more
than offset by the emotional trauma that would later accompany the
break up of the ensuing marriage, at which time the parties' investment,
"emotional and otherwise, in the relationship is likely to be greater.
Presumably, by not subjecting a prospective mate to the emotional
devastation that would probably accompany the subsequent broken
marriage, the party who breaches a promise to marry acts responsiblyY
Given this consideration, an award of damages for emotional anguish
and humiliation would be inconsistent with two basic policies underlying
section 90 and general contract law. The first policy i,: that an award of
damages should not place an aggrieved party in a better position than that
party would have been in had the promise been honored.2 2 If
compensated for the emotional anguish caused by a breach of a nuptial
promise, a promisee is decidedly better off than she would be if the
promisor kept the promise and, consequently, exposed aer to comparable
or greater emotional anguish in the course of the probable disintegration
of the ensuing marriage. 3 The second policy militating against such an
award of damages is the common-law's encouragement of acts of
mitigation. To the extent practicable, parties should take affirmative
steps to avoid damages that reasonably can be avoided. 254 In the unique
250. See Wright, supra note 53, at 373-74.
251. See also infra part IV.B.3 (acknowledging that, in some respects, the breach of a promise to
marry may be analogized to an "efficient breach").
252. See Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 12.8, at 874-75 (describing general principle); id. § 12.16,
at 930 (concluding general principle applies to awards of reliance damages).
253. Of course, under modem no-fault divorce statutes, one cannot recover damages for the
emotional anguish that accompanies the break-up of a marriage. Cf I Clark supra note 1, § 13.1, at
698-701 (describing evolution from divorce statutes focusing on marital wrongs to statutes that
consider fault irrelevant). A possible response to the arguments raised in there two paragraphs of the
text is that, by disallowing recovery of damages for emotional anguish, we reward a party who
breaches a nuptial promise because that party might have acted in bad faith to undermine the
marriage had it ensued. See Wright, supra note 53, at 373. If the breaching party truly has fallen out
of love, however, even a good-faith effort, in all probability, will not be enough to save the ensuing
marriage.
254. Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 350; Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 12.12, at 896-902.
Technically, the mitigation requirement of section 350 applies to parties aggrieved by the breach of a
particular promise. Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 350. In the unique context of broken
nuptial promises, however, it would be appropriate for courts applying section 90 to impose a similar
mitigation requirement on breaching parties.
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context of broken promises to marry, the breaching party can be viewed
as having taken steps to mitigate emotional-anguish damages. 5 By
avoiding an ill-advised marriage, the breaching party, in effect, "saves" a
prospective mate from suffering subsequent emotional turmoil. 6
Accordingly, even though emotional anguish and humiliation may be
foreseeable consequences of the breach of a promise to marry, justice
does not require, on balance, that an aggrieved party be compensated for
those injuries under section 90. There should, however, be common-
sense limitations placed on the extent to which a promisor is shielded by
promissory estoppel from responsibility for the foreseeable emotional
consequences of her actions. After all, the underlying justification for not
awarding these damages is that, if we give due consideration over time to
the net emotional toll exacted by breached nuptial promises, breaching
parties arguably act responsibly by ending engagements. An approach
based on promissory estoppel, therefore, would not preclude an
aggrieved party from appropriate tort recovery of emotional-anguish
damages in cases where a promise to marry is breached in an especially
cruel manner. A breaching party whose conduct verges on being tortious
should be held fully responsible for the resulting emotional
devastation." Therefore, a promisee should be able to recover for
emotional anguish if she can prove that the promisor knowingly lied in
making the promise to marry2 8 or breached the promise in such a
contemptible fashion as intentionally to inflict emotional anguish on the
promisee beyond that which would be caused by a breach under ordinary
circumstances. 9
3. Punitive Damages
By awarding punitive damages, courts in jurisdictions that retain the
traditional breach-of-promise action make their most overt, and most
255. See Wright, supra note 53, at 373-74.
256. See id.
257. Cf. Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 355 (providing for recovery of punitive damages if
the "conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable").
258. See Note, supra note 2, at 1783-97.
259. See Richard C. Ninneman & David L. Walther, Comment, Abolition of Breach of Promise in
Wi1sconsin-Scope and Constitutionality, 43 Marq. L. Rev. 341, 360-61 (1960). For a case that
presents allegations approaching the threshold of the standard suggested in the text, see Ferraro v.
Singh, 495 A.2d 946, 947-48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (describing allegations that plaintiff's betrothed
left the country to marry someone else without informing plaintiff).
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indefensible, departure from established contract doctrine.26 In the late
twentieth century, courts continue to be consistently :reluctant to award
punitive damages in actions based on bargain contract or promissory
estoppel.2 6' Economic theorists justify the courts' distaste for awarding
punitive damages in contracts cases by arguing that, in a market setting,
breaches of contract are often efficient.26 By this, they mean that the
breaching party has made a determination that the resources that
otherwise would be devoted to the breached contract can yield a greater
return (even after compensating the injured promisee for her losses) if
reallocated to some other purpose.263 These breaches of contract ought
not be discouraged, the theorists continue, because they promote one of
contract law's main goals-the movement of societal assets to their most
efficient uses." Courts, accordingly, should avoid awarding damages in
excess of those actually sustained by an injured promisee; awarding such
damages would deter the socially beneficial consequences of these
"efficient breaches." '265 By analogy, those who breach promises to marry
arguably act in a socially responsible manner to the extent they prevent
ensuing marriages that would be loveless and/or destined for failure. 6
These breaching parties also may be characterized as making a
determination that they can maximize their utility (happiness) by
deploying elsewhere the resources they otherwise would have brought to
the marriage.
Consequently, it would also be inappropriate to "punish" a breach of a
promise to marry by requiring a promisor to pay damages in excess of
those actually sustained by a promisee, unless the conduct constituting
the breach of contract is also tortious.267 If the promisor knowingly lied
when she made the promise to marry or breached he promise in an
egregious manner that clearly evinced an intention to induce emotional
260. See supra part I.B.
261. See Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 12.8, at 874-75 (describing punilive damages as damages
in excess of those needed to compensate injured party); id. § 12.16, at 93C (concluding that awards
of reliance damages should not exceed those needed to compensate the injured party).
262. See Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., 841 F.2d 742, 750-51 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.)
(applying efficient-breach theory to justify a denial of punitive damages); Fansworth, supra note 45,
§ 12.3, at 846-47 (describing efficient-breach hypothesis).
263. See Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 12.3, at 847; Murphy & Speidel, s'pra note 229, at 1037.
264. See Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 12.3, at 847-48.
265. Id.
266. See supra part I.C.
267. Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 355; Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 12.8, at 875-76. A
similar exception should be recognized with respect to the recovery of emotional-anguish damages
caused by breach of a promise to marry. See supra part IV.B.2.
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distress beyond that ordinarily caused by the breach of such a promise, a
court might appropriately award punitive damages in tort.2 61 Promissory
estoppel would not preclude such an award.
4. Reliance Damages
For reasons that will be further elaborated in this subpart, this Article
concludes that reliance damages are the only type of remedy available
under the traditional breach-of-promise action that justice today would
require to be awarded under section 90.269 As earlier noted, reliance
occurs when a promisee, presuming that a promise will be honored, takes
action she otherwise would not have taken or refrains from taking action
she otherwise would have taken."' 0 In order to capture the dual aspects of
reliance, the drafters of section 90 opted to speak in terms of the "action
or forbearance" foreseeably induced by a promise.27 Generally,
therefore, reliance damages can be broken into two basic components:
(1) the value of actions affirmatively and foreseeably taken in reliance on
a promise;272 and (2) the value of the opportunities the promisee
foreseeably refrained from pursuing in reliance on a promise.273
With respect to nuptial promises, the value of steps that a promisee
might affirmatively and foreseeably take in reliance on the promise
generally will be measured by expenditures made in anticipation of the
impending marriage on matters such as rings, wedding announcements,
facilities rental charges, priests, ministers or rabbis, bridal gowns,
photographers, florists, caterers, and musicians.274 Since expenditures on
268. See supra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
269. See also supra parts IV.A, IV.B.1 (discussing how an award of reliance damages under
section 90 is appropriate when at-will nature of a promise renders expectation interest incalculable).
As earlier noted, it was indefensible under the traditional breach of promise action to allow recovery
of reliance damages on top of expectation damages. See supra note 49.
270. See Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 90.
271. Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 90.
272. See, e.g., Murphy & Speidel, supra note 229, at 245 (noting that reliance interest includes
"out of pocket" expenditures).
273. See supra note 174.
274. See Bradley v. Somers, 322 S.E.2d 665, 666 (S.C. 1984) (detailing preparations taken by
plaintiff); Stanard v. Bolin, 88 Wash. 2d 614, 619, 565 P.2d 94, 96-97 (1977) (discussing range of
preparations that might be taken for a wedding). For a detailed discussion of costs associated with
getting married, see Fields & Fields, supra note 131,passim.
In light of the general requirement that one act to avoid damages to the extent practicable, an
aggrieved party, of course, would not be able to recover expenses described in this and the ensuing
paragraph to the extent they are refundable or otherwise can be mitigated. See Second Restatement,
supra note 22, § 350. A court awarding reliance damages also should be careful to reduce any
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the average wedding in this country total more than $15,000,275 providing
legal protection for these costs is far from a token gesture. In some cases,
section 90 provides protection for foreseeable acts of reliance on a
promise by third persons, 6 even those who might not qualify as
beneficiaries of the actionable promise.277 Accordingly, the parents or
guardians of a party aggrieved by breach of a promise to marry might be
allowed recovery under section 90 to the extent they have incurred, on
behalf of their son or daughter, any of the expenses itemized above. In
essence, for purposes of section 90, their expenditures on matters directly
related to the wedding ceremony or reception should be treated as if they
were made by their son or daughter.27 Under section 90, moreover, an
aggrieved party should be able to recover the net value of any costs she
foreseeably incurred in preparing to live with the breaching party in a
marital home.279
The value of a promisee's forbearance might include, in appropriate
cases, the foreseeable net loss of income sustained as a consequence of
leaving employment in anticipation of a prospective marriage2 80 or legal
rights foregone in preparation for an ensuing marriage (such as alimony
or other rights under a divorce decree).281 For the reasons detailed in part
IV.B. 1, however, a party aggrieved by the breach of a nuptial promise
recovery by the amount of any benefits retained by the aggrieved party as a -esult of acts of reliance
by either party to the engagement. See Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 12.16, at 929 n.7.
275. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
276. Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 90.
277. See id. § 90 cmt. c; Ravelo v. County of Hawaii, 658 P.2d 883, 887-88 (Haw. 1983)
(holding that, when defendant breached a promise of at-will employment, section 90 also would
allow protection of the reliance interest of the prospective employee's wife).
278. Cf. Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 90, cmt. c., illus. 7 (expenditures by aggrieved
party's husband and aunt are treated like those by the aggrieved party).
279. See Stanard v. Bolin, 88 Wash. 2d 614, 619, 565 P.2d 94, 97 (1977) (noting that an
aggrieved party's recovery might include expenses incurred in purchasing a house or buying
furniture). These costs also might encompass, in an appropriate case, travel and moving expenses
incurred by the promisee.
280. See 1 Clark, supra note 1, § 1.4, at 18 & n.10. See also Dukker v. Gidwitz, No. 94 L 04606
(Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County filed 1994) (alleging relinquishment ofjob in Te:xas to move to Illinois);
Beverlin v. Hartz, No. 93 L 11729 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County filed 1993) (alleging relinquishment of
employment in California to move to Illinois). Cf. supra notes 193-99 :rd accompanying text
(discussing cases allowing plaintiffs to recover net loss of income when they rely on promises to
enter into at-will employment contracts).
281. Cf Boyd v. Boyd, 39 Cal. Rptr. 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964) (ruling heartbalm statute bars claim
by plaintiff based on allegation that she relied on nuptial promise by relinquishing her right to
receive certain government stipends); Dukker v. Gidwitz, No. 94 L 04606 (II. Cir. Ct. Cook County
filed 1994) (alleging that, after extensive discussion with defendant, plaintiff relinquished her rights
under a divorce decree by moving from Texas to Illinois in reliance on a promise to marry).
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should not be able to recover damages for the loss of opportunity to
marry others.
In comment b to section 90, the drafters of the Second Restatement
suggested that, in deciding the extent to which justice requires
enforcement of a promise, courts should look at, among other things, the
degree to which the cautionary goal of contract law is met in a particular
setting.282 In a commercial setting, consideration plays a cautionary role
by alerting a promisor that, before making a particular promise, she
should consider it seriously.283 Similarly, under the scheme of section 90,
a promisor is alerted to the seriousness with which a promise should be
taken by the degree to which it is likely to induce substantial reliance.284
As shown in the preceding paragraphs, promises to marry are inherently
likely to induce significant steps of reliance.
One salutary benefit of using section 90 to redress breaches of nuptial
promises would be that it provides appropriate incentives for parties to
take these promises seriously before making them and initiating an
extensive cycle of reliance. Under section 90, liability will be a function
of the timing and cumulative effect of steps of reliance. Since these steps
of reliance usually will unfold gradually, promises to marry provide a
particularly appropriate context for reliance to play a cautionary role. In
most cases, the only significant act of reliance that might have taken
place when a nuptial promise is made is the gift of an engagement ring."'
Under a reliance-based approach, accordingly, there usually will be an
extended period in an engagement during which a party may withdraw
from the relationship with little or no liability.286 But, inevitably, the
hardship imposed by a decision to breach a nuptial promise will be more
extensive the longer one waits to end an engagement. Therefore, as the
wedding ceremony draws near and steps of reliance increase in number
and significance, reliance-based liability will behoove a party who is
having second thoughts about an impending marriage to discuss her
282. Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 90 cmt. b.
283. See Yorio & The], supra note 214, at 113 & n.13.
284. Id. at 124, 126-28.
285. See Cahners Research, supra note 132, at 5 (noting that 76% of respondents received or
expected to receive an engagement ring immediately upon becoming engaged).
286. During the early stages of most engagements, the only significant liability imposed on the
parties might be to return in restitution the engagement ring or other gifts conferred by the parties on
one another in contemplation of the planned marriage. See generally Perovich, supra note 93, at
581-88.
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irresolution with her betrothed as soon as possible.287 One would suspect,
for example, that rarely will a party who is not already secretly wavering
commit the most serious of all betrayals of confidence-standing up a
prospective mate at the altar on the day of the ceremony.288 Indeed, by
encouraging honest and forthright communication of uncertain feelings
early in an engagement, recovery geared to the reliance interest might
permit many relationships to be salvaged (through counseling, for
example, when problems are brought honestly to the forefront) that
might not be saved if a party procrastinated and abruptly ended the
engagement close to or at the wedding ceremony. In short, reliance-based
liability would encourage responsibility, honesty, and forthrightness,
values that are likely to enhance the overall stability of interpersonal
relationships headed towards marriage. T8 To the extent that promisors
are shielded from virtually all liability, they will be less inclined to take
promises to marry seriously. A goal of the law should be to teach and
encourage people to act responsibly.2 9 Heartbalm statutes, however,
subvert this goal by trivializing the consequences of ce.tain promises that
the state should encourage to be taken seriously.
Comment b to section 90 also provides that, in setting damages to be
awarded for breach of a promise, a court should consider the extent to
which the evidentiary goal of contract law is met in a given setting. 91
Generally, in a commercial setting, consideration fulfills this goal by
furnishing evidence of the parties' intent to be bound.292 By providing
some proof that a promise was in fact made, a promisee's reliance on a
287. In two cases, plaintiffs made unsuccessful attempts to avoid heartbalm statutes by arguing
that defendants' failures to disclose their changes of heart in a timely manner should give rise to tort
liability. See Ferraro v. Singh, 495 A.2d 946, 949 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (arguing that tort claim by
plaintiff, whose betrothed allegedly married someone else without informing her, was based on
defendant's "lack of communication with her"); Waddell v. Briggs, 381 A.2d 1132, 1134 (Me. 1978)
(alleging that defendant tortiously failed to disclose his intention not to attend wedding ceremony).
288. See Bradley v. Somers, 322 S.E.2d 665 (S.C. 1984) (holding defendant liable for damages
when he informed prospective bride of his change of mind at the church on the day of the wedding);
Waddel v. Briggs, 381 A.2d 1132 (Me. 1978) (ruling that defendant who failed to show up for the
wedding was protected by heartbalm statute).
289. Cf. Larson, supra note 34, at 438 (arguing that broad recognition of tort of sexual fraud will
enhance the quality of sexual relationships by "creating and supporting expectations of fairness and
honesty between sexual partners").
290. Williams, supra note 151, at 188.
291. Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 90 cmt. b.
292. See Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 104 N.W.2d 661, 665-66 (Minn. 1960); 1 Arthur L.
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 111, at 496 (1963).
1062
Vol. 70:1019, 1995
What To Do When There's No "I Do"
promise can also play an important evidentiary role.293 Accordingly, in
cases in which a promisee's reliance is highly corroborative of the
making of a promise, many modem courts permit a promissory-estoppel
exception to provisions of the Statute of Frauds."' In these cases, the
courts recognize that, when it is sufficiently probative of an alleged
promise, reliance can substitute for the writing otherwise required by the
Statute of Frauds.29
Although arguably exaggerated, one of the charges repeatedly leveled
against the traditional breach-of-promise action was that courts applied
lax evidentiary standards which sometimes allowed alleged promises to
marry to be proved with fraudulent testimony.296 Another principal
advantage of reliance-based liability, then, is that it will significantly
curtail opportunities for perjury in this context, because the very acts of
reliance that provide the basis of recovery will also tend to prove that the
promise to marry was, in fact, made by a defendant. For example, it is
customary for an engagement ring to be given to a prospective bride.297
In many cases, the conferral of the engagement ring will be the first
significant act of reliance by either party.298 When conferred and
accepted, the engagement ring constitutes especially compelling
evidence that both parties have made promises to marry. In addition, acts
such as ordering bridal gowns, renting halls, hiring photographers, and
ordering wedding announcements are not usually done by persons who
do not intend to marry. Moreover, the names of the prospective bride and
groom will be used in the course of making these very public
arrangements. Reliance-based enforcement of promises to marry would
make it exceedingly difficult to hale innocent defendants into court (or to
blackmail them) on the basis of fraudulently alleged promises to marry.
293. See Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1287 (7th Cir. 1986)
(noting that reliance "adds something in the way of credibility to the mere say-so of one party");
Yorio & The], supra note 214, at 159 & n.332.
294. See Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 139; Michael B. Metzger, The Parol Evidence
Rule: Promissory Estoppel's Next Conquest?, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 1383 (1983).
295. See Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 139(2)(c) (emphasizing that courts take into
account the extent to which reliance "corroborates evidence of the making and terms of the
promise').
296. See supra part I.C.
297. See Cahners Research, supra note 132, at 5 (showing that 98% of engaged brides had
received, or expected to receive, an engagement ring). Interestingly, conferring engagement rings on
prospective brides was not a convention in this country prior to the 1930s. Brinig, supra note 114, at
203.
298. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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The imposition of reliance-based liability in relat'on to a breached
nuptial promise can also be squared with another tenet of modem
contract theory: the proposition that most parties who have not explicitly
agreed to an allocation of a particular risk would prefer that it be
allocated to the party in the best position to avoid the loss associated with
that risk. 99 Generally, the party who breaches a promise to marry is in
the best position to avoid the loss caused by the breach since that party
could have refrained from making a nuptial promise until she was more
certain of her decision to enter into marriage.3" Again, the allocation of
reliance losses to the breaching party is appropriate.
As observed in part IV.B.3 of this Article, economic theorists
commend the refusal of courts to award punitive damages in contracts
cases because such awards discourage efficient breachaes. The fact that
efficient breaches are socially beneficial, however, is not deemed to
absolve breaching parties of all liability; they still must answer to
aggrieved parties for damages actually caused by their breaches.3"' By
analogy, even though a decision not to enter into an ill-fated marriage
may be of some social benefit, parties who breach promises to marry
nonetheless should be answerable to injured parties for the harm-the
reliance-caused by breached nuptial promises.
Indeed, of the arguments against the traditional breach-of-promise
action, there is only one that still might warrant some hesitation in
awarding reliance damages under section 90 for breaches of nuptial
promises. It can be argued that the imposition of any level of liability for
broken promises to marry is to be shunned for fear of creating incentives
for people to enter into loveless and unstable marriages rather than face
possible lawsuits." As a practical matter, when recovery is limited to the
aggrieved party's reliance interest, as proposed in this Article, it is hard
to imagine a party choosing to enter into a bad marriage simply to avoid
being held liable for reliance damages. Moreover, the limitations on
recovery that I propose make it unlikely that unscrupulous plaintiffs will
299. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 93-94 (4th ed. 1992); Barnett & Becker,
supra note 150, at 479.
300. Cf Barnett & Becker, supra note 150, at 479-80 (arguing that employer who extends a
promise of at-will employment is in the best position to avoid the loss caused by anticipatory breach
of that promise, because it can refrain from making the promise until a tinal decision has been
made).
301. See Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 12.3, at 847; Murphy & Speidel, supra note 229, at 1037.
302. See supra part I.C.
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be able to use breach-of-promise suits brought under section 90 as tools
of extortion."0
V. BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY AND PROTECTION OF
THE RELIANCE INTEREST IN JURISDICTIONS WITH AND
WITHOUT HEARTBALM STATUTES
For the reasons elaborated in part IV, there is no sound policy basis
for disallowing the recovery of reliance damages caused by breach of a
promise to marry. Interestingly, several prominent, early critics of the
traditional breach-of-promise action would not object to this conclusion;
they argued for the reformation of the breach-of-promise action in ways
that, by and large, would have left intact protection of an aggrieved
party's reliance interest."' Indeed, shortly after the enactment of the first
heartbalm statutes, one of those critics specifically cautioned against
interpreting the statutes to bar an aggrieved party from appropriate relief
under promissory estoppel."'
Over recent years, a recurring issue in jurisdictions that abolished the
breach-of-promise action has been whether (and, if so, to what extent)
heartbalm statutes permit courts to award reliance damages to parties
wronged by broken nuptial promises."° Unfortunately, in the cases
303. See supra part IV.B.1.
304. See McCormick, supra note 1, § 111, at 405-06 (advocating only the elimination of
expectation and punitive damages); Feinsinger, supra note 3, at 1000 (arguing that heartbalm statutes
should not bar recovery "on ordinary principles of tort, promissory estoppel or quasi-contract");
Kane, supra note 91, at 71 (contending that a statute rejected by the New York legislature that would
have limited recovery "to actual expenses paid or incurred in contemplation of the marriage" would
have been desirable and effectual).
305. Feinsinger, supra note 3, at 1000.
306. See Snider v. Keenan, No. 92-J-39, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 535, at *1-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb.
11, 1994) (ruling that heartbalm statute barred recovery of financial loss incurred as a result of a
promise to marry); Selfv. Haddix, No. 9844, 1987 WL 12226 (Ohio Ct. App. June 2, 1987) (holding
that heartbalm statute barred recovery of expenses incurred in preparation for wedding); Bruno v.
Guerra, 549 N.Y.S.2d 925 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (ruling that heartbalm statute barred recovery of
$28,000 expended in preparation for wedding); Aronow v. Silver, 538 A.2d 851, 856 (NJ. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1987) (holding heartbalm statute precluded recovery of various wedding expenses); Ferraro
v. Singh, 495 A.2d 946, 947-49 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (denying recovery of expenditures made in
anticipation of wedding); Piccininni v. Hajus, 429 A.2d 886, 888 (Conn. 1980) (stating that
heartbalm statute barred recovery for expenditures made in anticipation of the wedding); Waddell v.
Briggs, 381 A.2d 1132 (Me. 1978) (heartbalm statute held to bar recovery for monetary loss caused
by breach of promise to marry); Boyd v. Boyd, 39 Cal. Rptr. 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964) (ruling that
heartbalm statute barred action to recover damages in respect of government benefits foregone in
reliance on nuptial promise).
In the Sef, Bruno, Aronow, and Waddell cases, parents of the plaintiffs also sought to recover
reliance expenditures made in preparation for the weddings. If these courts had been willing to
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addressing this issue, courts have uniformly refused to protect the
reliance interests of aggrieved plaintiffs.0 7 In doing so, several courts
have frankly acknowledged that their -rulings may be unfair to these
plaintiffs, but felt themselves constrained by the sweeping language that
legislatures used in the pertinent heartbalm statutes."' As the court
lamented in Ferraro v. Singh,3" "the law does not provide a remedy for
every wrong; some wrongs are simply not legally cognizable wrongs."3 10
To avoid the proscription of heartbalm statutes, the great majority of
courts have employed either restitution or conditional gift theory to
interpret heartbalm legislation as permitting equitable recovery of gifts
one has given a former betrothed in contemplation of a marriage that
does not take place.3" Generally, for purposes of recovery under this
rule, it does not matter which of the parties is responsible for the break
up of an engagement.312 Nevertheless, when confronted with the issue,
most courts in heartbalm jurisdictions recognize one notable exception to
this general gift recovery rule: a party who breaches a nuptial promise is
barred from recovering an engagement ring conferred on the other
party.3"3 This exception demonstrates that, even in most jurisdictions that
abolished the breach-of-promise action, courts have found a way to voice
an enduring conviction that parties who dishonor promises to marry have
committed wrongs for which they should be answerable, at least to some
extent.
The problem with the approach taken by these courts, however, is that
they end up imposing liability in a helter-skelter fashion that often bears
recognize a promissory-estoppel exception to their states' heartbalm statutes, a strong case could be
made for allowing parents or guardians to recover expenditures directly related to the wedding
ceremony or reception. See supra part V.B.4.
307. See supra note 306.
308. See Ferraro, 495 A.2d at 949-50; Boyd, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 403-04.
309. 495 A.2d 946 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
310. Id. at 950.
311. See Perovich, supra note 93, at 588-95. The net result of this rule, of course, is indirectly to
provide limited protection for a party's reliance expenditures to the extent they are used to buy these
gifts. Under this rule, however, the bulk of wedding-related expenditures cannot be protected when a
promise to marry is broken; by virtue of breaching the nuptial promise, a party avoids receiving the
benefit of those expenditures. See Bruno v. Guerra, 549 N.Y.S.2d 925, 926 -,N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
In some cases, heartbalm statutes have been explicitly amended to direct courts to allow recovery
of gifts given in contemplation of marriage. See Perovich, supra note 93, at 588, 591-93.
312. See Perovich, supra note 93, at 601-02, 604-06 (donor entitled to recover engagement ring
if engagement is dissolved by agreement or if donee is at fault for ending ergagement).
313. See id. at 602-04. But see Aronow v. Silver, 538 A.2d 851, 852 ,N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1987) (acknowledging majority rule, but electing to adopt minority position).
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little relation to the damages actually caused by breach of a particular
promise to marry. Pursuant to social custom, engagement rings usually
are given only by men to women.31a Women and their families, on the
other hand, often bear a disproportionate share of the expenses related to
the wedding ceremony. In heartbalm jurisdictions, therefore, there is the
potential for gender-biased results when courts apply a rule of law that,
for the most part, penalizes only men315 who breach promises to marry
(but then, in turn, limits their liability to the extent they may have
invested in an engagement ring). In a prototypical situation, if a man
breaches a promise to marry early in the engagement period, the value of
the engagement ring probably will greatly exceed the value of the
prospective bride's reliance interest, thereby giving her a windfall.
Conversely, if the man's breach of promise occurs late in the engagement
period, the value of the ring may be significantly less than the value of
the prospective bride's reliance interest, thereby undercompensating her.
The engagement ring constitutes, in effect, a form of court-imposed
liquidated damages for the breach of a promise to marry. However, as is
the case with a liquidated-damages clause agreed to by parties to a
contract, a court's provision for damages should be deemed
objectionable if, as shown here, it does not bear a reasonable relationship
to a promisee's actual or anticipated damages.3" 6
In jurisdictions that have abolished the breach-of-promise action, a
preferable course of action would be for courts to acknowledge a
promissory-estoppel exception to the heartbalm statutes and, in
accordance with this Article, award reliance damages to any party
aggrieved by breach of a nuptial promise. But, given the precedents
described earlier,3"7 courts appear unlikely to recognize a reliance-based
exception to the heartbalm statutes. This is the case even though, as
demonstrated in this Article, the recognition of such an exception would
not lead to any of the evils historically associated with the traditional
breach-of-promise action."8 A glimmer of hope, however, is provided by
the fact that, as far as can be gathered from a search of the cases, no
314. See Brinig, supra note 114, at 203.
315. I am assuming for present purposes, of course, that a party is not "penalized" in a real sense
if a court, pursuant to the general rule, requires him or her to return a gift made in contemplation of
marriage. Therefore, a woman who breaches a promise to marry and, accordingly, has to return an
engagement ring has not in this sense been penalized.
316. See Second Restatement, supra note 22, § 356; Farnsworth, supra note 45, § 12.18, at 935-
38.
317. See supra note 306.
318. See supra part IV.B.
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plaintiff who has sought an award of reliance damages has explicitly
argued that promissory estoppel provides a basis for circumventing the
applicable heartbalm statute.319 Accordingly, especially in jurisdictions
that consider promissory estoppel an equitable theory of recovery,320
there remains a possibility that courts might be receptive to an argument
that they should recognize a promissory-estoppel exception to heartbalm
legislation.
On the other hand, in jurisdictions that have not legislatively abolished
the breach-of-promise action, courts ought to bring promises to marry
within the mainstream of their common-law jurisprudence, by
recognizing that promissory estoppel provides the best theoretical
framework for assessing the optimal level at which to impose liability for
breaches of promises to marry. Then, following the analysis in this
Article, these courts should limit an injured party's recovery for breach
of a nuptial promise to an award of reliance damages.
In both heartbalm and breach-of-promise action states, given
troublesome case law precedent, state legislatures, rather than the courts,
are probably the most promising venues in which to advocate reliance-
based protection for those harmed by breached promises to marry. A
number of decades have passed since the enactment of the first heartbalm
statutes in the 1930s. At the time they were enacted, promissory estoppel
was only beginning to emerge as a broadly recognized theory of
liability. 21 Moreover, as previously noted, the heartbalrn statutes were, in
large part, inspired by misogynistic attitudes rather than a dispassionate
evaluation of the overall fairness of the breach-of-promise action. 22 As
we approach a new millennium, the time is ripe for legislatures in
heartbalm jurisdictions to reconsider the extent to which it is appropriate
to shield people from bearing responsibility for the harm caused by
broken nuptial promises. To the extent they are persuaded by the analysis
in this Article, these legislatures would amend heartbalm statutes to
permit reliance-based recovery. They should do this either by making
clear that the heartbalm statutes are not a bar to promrdssory estoppel or
by including specific language in the heartbalm statutes consistent with
the reliance-based approach advocated herein.
319. Although the court in Boyd v. Boyd, 39 Cal. Rptr. 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964), mentioned
promissory estoppel in passing, it did not directly address the doctrine's implications vis-&-vis the
California heartbahn statute. Id. at 404 n.3.
320. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
321. See supra part IV.A.
322. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Despite more than a century of debate, no consensus has been reached
in this society regarding the proper approach to breaches of promises to
marry. This Article uses the common-law framework of promissory
estoppel to propose an optimal solution that is not currently recognized
in any American jurisdiction: parties who breach promises to marry
should bear responsibility for their conduct, but only to the extent they
have induced reliance by those to whom they were formerly engaged.
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